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COMMENT
Gary Donnison and Peter Bryant
The four-volume Report of the Committee 
of Inquiry into Technological Change in 
Australia — the Myers’ Report — has fallen 
like the proverbial lead balloon on the 
Australian public. Apart from some starry- 
eyed newspaper editorials, the Report has 
been widely criticised from many different 
sources. Ian Reinecke, in the Financial 
Review, attacked it for its “bureaucratic 
solutions” to the problems o f new 
technology. Computerworld, the foremost 
journal for computer personnel, accurately 
criticised it for its failure to deal with the 
problem of unemployment. But there’s little 
surprise in this. Much of the Myers’ Report 
reads like propaganda from the Department 
of Productivity (which provided key 
members of the Committee’s Secretariat).
Bureaucratic Solutions
In one of its thirty recommendations, the 
report proposes that a Bureau of the Working
Environment be set up to “ assist in the 
improvement of the quality of working life 
for all Australians” . And where will this 
bureau be located? You’ve guessed it — in the 
D epartm ent o f  P rod u ctiv ity . This 
recommendation expresses the dominant 
theme of the report: new technology is good 
for everybody in the long run because it 
promotes economic growth and development 
(capitalist development). However, to 
remove the roadblocks o f fear and 
opposition, the workers will be given a sugar- 
coating on the bitter pill. The report 
recommends that a Technology Awareness 
Program be established, and administered 
by the Department of Productivity. Several 
other well-established bodies will be involved 
in this, including the Bureau of Industry 
Economics and the Bureau of Labour Market 
Research.
These particular recommendations should 
be seen as part of a widening campaign to 
sell the virtues of capitalism to Australian 
workers. If Myers’ Technology Awareness
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Program is anything like the propaganda 
turned out by the Productivity Promotion 
Council of Australia (also linked to the 
Department of Productivity) it will be a 
chorus of praise for the virtues of private 
enterprise and the free market economy. It is 
essential that workers show resistance to 
this rising tide o f militant business ideology 
through union and rank-and-file action 
determined to challenge the employers’ 
monopoly on deciding when and where new 
technologies will be introduced.
Unemployment
The Myers’ Report offers no fair or viable 
solutions to the problems of unemployment. 
As with all complex issues the report deals 
with, when the problem gets tough it declines 
to think seriously about the most appropriate 
solution. It draws a distinction between 
u n em ploym en t cau sed  d irectly  by 
technological change and unemployment of 
a more pervasive kind, related to the 
economic structural aspects of the current 
recession. The report is virtually silent on 
how the unemployment problem in Australia 
is related to international capital flows or 
how  “ te ch n o lo g y  tr a n s fe r ”  (g lo b a l 
com m ercialisation) is sign ificant in 
e x p l a i n i n g  t e c h n o 1 o g y - i n d u c e d 
unemployment. It says nothing of the 
influence over the Australian economy that 
massive foreign capital penetration has 
given the multinational corporations.
The report recommends a “ social safety 
net” to deal with the problem of people made 
redundant through technological change. It 
offers a sliding scale of benefits under a 
temporary income maintenance scheme to 
“persons retrenched through no fault of their 
own” . They would receive, for a fixed period 
after retrenchment, a fixed proportion of 
their weekly earnings which might vary 
from one month’s benefit for persons 
employed by the same employer for three to 
five years, to six months’ benefit for persons 
who were so employed for 10 years or more. 
Presumably, if you were employed by the 
same employer for less than three years, 
you’ll get nothing at all. This will obviously 
have a harsh and discriminatory effect on 
many workers, particularly women, 
migrants, and youth who are much more 
likely to change jobs or to be employed
intermittently than most older, male
workers. Also, will the workers on Myers’ : 
safety-net benefit be seen merely as the upper
class in the ranks of the “ dole bludgers” ?
Who benefits?
Despite the report’s inadequate proposals
to deal with redundancies, the committee has 
also failed to acknowledge, in any serious 
way, that the benefits of new technology will 
be distributed unequally. Myers naively 
assumes that these “ benefits”  will 
automatically flow to all in the community. 
This is never true! Its major beneficiaries will 
be large private companies; its victims will 
be retrenched workers and the unemployed 
and unemployable. As for workers lucky 
enough to be employed, they will pay the 
costs of new technology through their taxes, 
in two ways — first, through effective 
subsidies paid to private companies 
investing in new technology, and secondly, 
through paying the costs of the social safety 
net provisions for those workers made 
redundant by new technology.
Myers’ social safety net is, quite literally, 
full of holes. No safety net could be devised 
which could cope with the more intractable 
long-term problem o f lost employment 
opportunities and jobless growth. It is well 
known that most labour displacement 
occurring through technological change in 
Australia takes the form of natural wastage 
or attrition. And new technologies make it 
possible for firms to expand production 
without the creation of new jobs.
If Myers’ social safety net is, as Laurie 
Carmichael rightly called it, a “ sugar-coated 
pill” to help people swallow technological 
change and managerial prerogative over 
those changes, then the report offers other 
s w e e t e n e r s .  A n u m b e r  o f  key 
recommendations are addressed to what the 
committee sees as a problem with unions, 
particularly smaller craft-based unions, 
hindering technological change through a 
“craft mentality” and creating impediments 
to change through demarcation disputes. For 
these reasons, Myers wants full steam ahead 
with union amalgamations. It is even 
suggested that (another) government body 
be set up, a union amalgamation assistance 
unit, to cover the costs to unions of “ .... 
materials, legal advice and temporary
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administrative staff necessary to handle the 
amalgamation
The report is clearly unhappy with the 
existence of small craft-based unions, and 
one of its recommendations proposes that 
unions should be allowed to be registered 
only when they represent 2,000 or more 
members, and a union whose numbers fall 
below 1,500 should have to “ show cause” 
why it should not be deregistered. This 
proposal strikes at the democratic rights of 
workers to be represented by unions as they 
see fit, and on their own terms. No similar 
proposals are made to ask employers to 
“show cause” if their corporate empire is too 
large (or small?), whether their interests are 
too narrow, or if their profits are huge or if 
they cannot exist without taxpayers’ 
generous subsidies (a form of social welfare 
paid to capitalist enterprises).
Amalgamations
A major implication of these proposals on 
union amalgamation is the likely growth of 
union bureaucracies, and their consequent 
remoteness from the interests of the rank and 
file. But perhaps this is what Myers really 
wants — officials skilled in the bargaining 
routines and legalisms of arbitration where 
people at the top talk to other people at the 
top. Col Cooper of the ATEA has referred to 
this prospect recently, though it apparently 
never crossed the mind o f the union 
movement’s representative on the Myers 
Committee, Bill Mansfield (also of the 
ATEA). The ten d en cy  to propose  
bureaucratic solutions to the vexed problems 
of power and conflict appears in many places 
throughout the report. The assumption is 
always made that workers will respond 
favorably to technological change, if they 
are not led astray by “ deviant”  rank-and-file 
opposition. Even the Trade Union Training 
Authority (TUT A) is to share in the invidious 
task of “emphasising the capacity of the 
union movement to study and respond to 
technological change, through training 
trade unionists involved in representing 
employees during the process of “ change” .
Who D ecides?
If the Myers Committee sees the process of 
technological change as an inevitable one 
(and nothing it says suggests otherwise),
th en  h ow  s h o u ld  th e  v e ry  f i r s t  
recom m en d ation  in the report be 
interpreted? It says that “ the Government 
should sponsor a test case before the 
C o m m o n w e a lth  C o n c i l ia t i o n  and  
Arbitration Commission with a view to 
setting minimum standards to be observed 
by management — on notification, provision 
of information, and consultation when 
technological change is to occur” . The 
recommendation does not suggest at what 
point this notification, etc. should occur. Is it 
to be at the stage where management first 
“contemplates” the introduction of new 
technology? The wider context of the report 
seems to suggest that it will be more than 
adequate for m anagem ent to notify 
employees, not when decisions on w hether 
the introduction o f some new technology 
should go ahead, but w hen it w ill go ahead. 
The implication is that at no stage should 
workers, and others directly affected by any 
proposed changes in the work process, be 
given the right to decide if the changes are in 
their interests.
“ F ree”  Enterprise
Many of the report’s recommendations 
relate directly to the particular interests of 
p r i v a t e  c o m p a n i e s .  T h e r e  is  a 
recommendation that provision be made for 
the making of loans to companies which 
could be interest-free and would be repayable 
in the case of projects that were successful 
and profitable. Ultimately, the cost of an 
unsuccessful venture would be borne by the 
taxpayers. In any event, the capacity of 
firms to understate their profits would make 
the provisions open to manipulation. Also, 
who decides what is a “ successful” venture, 
or what particular ventures should get 
priority on loan funds? The report offers no 
suggestion on appropriate guidelines. Would 
a company producing electronic space games 
for milk bars have priority over another 
company using less of the new technology 
but producing more socially useful goods?
The report speaks of funding research 
which is “ in the public interest” , so long as 
the projects involved have entered “ a 
commercial development phase” . This offers 
nothing to non-commercial ventures which 
have an important role in developing 
alternative technologies for mainly non­
commercial purposes. For example, APACE,
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a non-profit organisation in New South 
Wales, is currently researching and 
developing technologies which will increase 
the self-sufficiency of people in rural 
communities. But they will get no comfort 
from the Myers Report where technology is 
viewed as useful only in the context of 
capitalist enterprise.
The report points to the need for a more 
generous investment allowance scheme in 
the form o f attractive depreciation 
deductions, so that newer technologies may 
be acquired by firms at the earliest possible 
date. This is likely to exacerbate the problem 
of technological redundancy. The committee, 
in a fashion typical of its approach to similar 
q u estion s, fee ls  th a t p rod u ctiv ity  
improvement provides a firm basis for 
sustained employment. And well it might be, 
if the new technology were the same as the 
old and if  we didn ’t have structural 
unemployment. The committee’s consistent 
optimism hardly answered the arguments in 
the submission made by the peak union 
councils of ACTU, CAGEO, and ACSPA 
which said:
.... While the encouragement of firms to 
invest in plant and equipment may yield 
som e lon g -term  b en e fits  to the 
Australian economy, the short-term 
effects have been disastrous. By 
reducing the relative cost o f capital at 
times o f high unem ploym ent, the 
Australian government has worsened 
the situation. The increase in investment 
in plant and equipment which took place 
after 1975 has undoubtedly worsened 
unemployment in Australia. This is a 
positive encouragement to replace men 
with machines.
Who Suffers?
The report says that the groups in the 
Australian community which suffer worst 
from technological change are — women, 
young people, immigrants, and the aged. 
Each of these groups gets a brief mention in 
the report, though it is noticeable that none 
are given direct representation on any of the 
many committees which Myers proposes to 
deal w ith  prob lem s o f  the “ work 
environment” . Consequently, there is no 
good reason to expect that their special
in terests  w ould be g iv en  special 
consideration.
In particular, the report is extremely weak 
in the way it deals with the problems of 
women in the workforce, despite the excellent 
submissions it received on the problems 
affecting working women. Typically, the 
report refers to these submissions, but those 
which express anything less than guarded 
optimism about technological change are 
quietly forgotten. Although the report 
recognises the differences in male and 
fem ale  em ploym en t p attern s and 
opportunities, when it discusses (by way of 
example) the displacem ent o f women 
telephonists by automatic exchanges, it 
seems to suggest that the problems would be 
much the same if the telephonists were 
males! The difference in the “cultural 
mandates” imposed on men and women 
make it clear that women in general simply 
don’t have the same freedom to choose new 
jobs in new areas in the same way as men.
But to have a bet both ways, Myers 
suggests that the special problems facing 
women can best be overcome in the long run 
through education. Education provides a 
convenient fall-back position for the 
committee, since it enables it to look good 
while avoiding any serious thought as to how 
education can “ call forth” jobs. It shifts the 
problems on to institutions that cannot solve 
them.
The committee’s remarks on migrants 
comprise one half-page, and include the 
profound observation that “ those who speak 
English are more likely to get a higher status 
job than those who don’t .... ” Similar insight 
is found in the brief remarks on youth, and on 
older workers: “ the young are thought to be 
more adaptable to and accommodating of 
c h a n g e , a n d  m ore  at h om e  w ith  
computerised machinery” . Of course, as any 
manager knows, younger workers who lack 
the hard experiences o f employment are 
more likely to do what they are told. But all is 
not bleak for older workers because we are 
told that other managers “ prefer older 
workers on the grounds that they are ‘people 
we can trust’ .” !!!
Perhaps the high point of Myers’ critical 
insight is found on page 107 of the report 
where it is said that “ those already in 
employment are better placed to preserve
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their advantage than those seeking 
employment or re-employment, and those in 
employment for the longer periods are able to 
transfer the impact (of labor-displacing 
technology) to those employed for shorter 
periods” . Thus does Myers turn platitudes 
into sweeping proclamations.
It is clear that the Myers Committee gave 
little thought to issues of equality. Given its 
fixation^ burgeoning economic growth, the 
report actually calls for a widening of income 
inequality by proposing the “ broadbanding” 
of skill classifications. This would mean that 
workers categorised at different levels of skill 
could not claim wage increases which would 
put them in an income band appropriate to 
those with higher skills. Consistent with 
this, the report is strong in its attacks on 
those narrow wage differentials which it 
believes have affected the supply of skilled 
tradesmen in industry. Once again, a 
sweetener is proposed, in the form of a high- 
wage “carrot” for the highly skilled (but a 
stick for the unskilled).
The proposals on broadbanding skills 
sounds unusually naive, given the realities o f  
industrial relations in Australia. The 
committee clearly wasn’t concerned that its 
proposals on union amalgamations might be 
in conflict with its support for widening wage 
differentials. On one hand, workers are to be 
unified under broad industry-based unions, 
but on the other, they are to be divided by 
insisting on widening wage differentials.
Opposition to the Report
Fortunately, more and more unions are 
beginning to respond in a highly critical way 
to the Myers Committee Report. At a recent 
public meeting in Sydney, representatives of 
17 different unions carried a resolution 
which condemned the report on a number of 
grounds. In particular, the resolution 
condemned the report for ignoring the 
substantial problems that the rapid 
expansion of micro-electronic technology is 
creating for existing and future generations 
of workers. It also said that the report failed 
to put forward effective strategies for 
controlling the social impact of the new 
technology.
It should be clear that the Myers Report 
has failed in the task it was set by the Fraser 
government: “ to examine, report and make
recom m endations on the process o f 
technological change in Australian industry 
in order to maximise economic, social and 
other benefits and minimise any possible 
adverse consequences” . Given the economic 
and political circumstances in which the 
committee was given its brief, its failure was 
only to be expected.
Over all, the Myers Committee has treated 
technological change in isolation from the 
social system in which it operates. Its 
muddled use of mechanistic and pluralist 
assumptions leaves it completely unable to 
deal with fundamental questions of power in 
a class-divided society. Throughout the 
report, one senses the committee’s 
discomfort at even thinking about the 
meaning of conflict. The questions it asked, 
and the answers it gives, lack any awareness 
that technological change is fundamentally 
a political question. Myers merely wants us 
to be nice to each other, so that everything 
will work out fine.
Technology can be a liberating force, or it 
can be a source of grievous social problems. 
All technologies have implications for 
control — both in terms of its design and in 
the way technology is used in a particular 
work organisation. The history of capitalism 
shows many examples where the choice of a 
particular technology has meant not only 
higher profits but an increasing level of 
control over the workforce. This is perhaps 
the most significant sense in which it can be 
said that all technologies have a political 
dimension.
The long-term response of workers to 
technological change should be to use 
technology for the production of socially 
useful goods and services where production 
is for need, not for private profit. This 
approach is already being demonstrated 
with some success in the activities of 
workers’ organisations like those at the 
Lucas Aerospace company in England. 
However, the immediate task for workers in 
Australia is to challenge the monopoly of 
control by management on technology and 
all other matters in the workplace. More and 
more, people are beginning to show an 
impatience with the view that they should 
have no say in workplace decisions which 
affect their daily lives. Only their committed 
action can roll back Myers’ ideological 
offensive on behalf of capital.
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EDRPDRflTOTS
and the Australian 
manufacturing Industry
Greg Crough
Introduction
The Australian manufacturing industry is 
in crisis. In the last decade manufacturing 
em ploym ent leve ls  have d eclin ed  
substantially, production has stagnated, 
and thousands of companies have been 
taken over or ceased operations. The relative 
declin e  o f  the im p orta n ce  o f  the 
manufacturing industry, however, has been 
symptomatic of the profound process of 
structural change that is occurring in the 
Australian economy and society, a process 
which will if it remains unchecked by the 
forces of labor inevitably lead to the further 
integration of Australia into a world system 
over which national control is very difficult.
This process of structural change affecting 
the manufacturing industry is the inevitable 
result of a variety of factors, including the 
gradual liberalisation of trade, technological 
change, and changes in patterns of demand 
due to factors such as dem ographic 
influences. I would argue, however, that the 
major force accelerating and accentuating 
these changes is the transnational 
corporation, which in the last two decades 
has come to assume a position of critical 
importance in the capitalist world system. 
The transnational corporations are the 
major beneficiaries of free trade, they are the 
,, most technologically dynamic entities in the
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world, and they are involved in activities 
across a broad spectrum of the economy 
influencing patterns of demand, life styles 
and attitudes.
In order to examine these changes in the 
present context it is necessary to look briefly 
at the historical developm ent o f the 
manufacturing industry in Australia. The 
main point that will become obvious from 
this survey is that Australia, in common 
with many other developed capitalist 
countries, did not industrialise under a free 
trade regime, but on the contrary developed 
its manufacturing behind a protectionist 
wall which shielded industries and their 
workers from the forces operating in the 
world economy.
Brief History of the Australian  
Manufacturing Industry
The tariff played an important role in the 
development of manufacturing from 1908-39, 
as early Labor governments recognised it as 
a means of increasing workers’ wages and 
the achievement of a variety of social 
objectives. As the Brigden Report of 1929 
clearly stated:
The evidence available does not support 
the contention that Australia could have 
maintained its present population at a 
higher standard o f living under free  
trade... The tariff has had the effect o f pooling 
the national income to a greater extent than 
would have been predictable if assistance to 
industry were derived solely through the 
more obvious method of taxation...The 
diversion of production to the protected 
industries has increased the diversity of 
occupations and of opportunities, and 
introduced more stability into the national 
income than if it had been more dependent on 
the seasons and the vagaries o f overseas 
markets. (1)
After World War II, the overriding 
constraint on Australian econom ic 
development was a chronic shortage of 
foreign exchange, and in common with a 
number of other countries, exchange control 
restrictions were introduced, followed by 
import quotas in 1952. Increased emphasis 
was g iven  to im port su bstitu tion  
industrialisation. As the Jackson Committee 
indicated, such a policy, apart from 
conserving foreign exchange was also 
consistent with certain important longer 
term objectives of Labor, including full
employment with rising living standards, 
high population growth, and a more equal 
distribution of income. (2) It was only in the 
mid-1960s, with the growth of mineral 
exports, that tariffs came to replace import 
quotas as the main element of protection, as 
the balance o f payments constraint eased.
Of course, as we all know, the 1970s have 
been characterised by a chorus of voices 
arguing for lower protection, rationalisation, 
restructuring, and for Australia to produce 
according to its “ competitive advantage” .
I think that a careful study of Australia’s 
industrial development clearly indicates 
that to a large extent we have been able to 
achieve such a relatively high standard of 
living by protecting and stimulating 
domestic industries. It also indicates that a 
cou n try  can  crea te  a com p arative  
advantage, that comparative advantage, as 
it is eulogised by the free traders, is not an 
unchanging characteristic of every nation to 
which its destiny is inescapably tied. (3) A 
country with the resources of Australia, with 
appropriate national industrial and 
economic policies, has no need to specialise 
in only a few products, but can instead 
establish and develop a broad self-reliant 
industrial structure.
However, although Australia followed a 
path  o f  in d u str ia lisa tio n  behind 
protectionist barriers, as did Japan, 
Germany and the United States, this was not 
a planned process. The pattern of industrial 
development was largely left to private 
corporations whose goals for a certain period 
of time happened to coincide with certian 
national objectives, but which are now, 
following the same principles, operating 
substantially against the interests of the 
Australian economy and society.
The result of this laissez-faire period of 
industrial development was an industrial 
structure which is fragmented, dispersed, 
and to a large extent inefficient. The 
problems of the lack of national planning 
were exacerbated by the existence of State 
governments, which competed against each 
other to a ttra ct in d u stry , and the 
corporations were able to systematically 
play off these governments and extract the 
maximum return.
Intimately related to the whole process of 
Australian industrial development was the 
wholesale movement into Australia of the
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transnational corporations, and other 
foreign investors, in the post World War II 
period. Prevented from exporting to a 
potentially lucrative market, and attracted 
by generous concessions from the State and 
Federal governments, British and American 
corporations flooded into Australia, 
establishing factories, employing thousands 
of workers, and making deep inroads into the 
markets for both industrial and consumer 
products. It is these companies in particular, 
and a number of large Australian-owned 
companies, which are now beginning to 
restructure their operations in this country, 
in line with the changes in the global 
economy. Before moving on to discuss these 
changes, however, it would be useful to 
discuss some o f the most important 
characteristics of the industry in Australia.
Characteristics o f the Manufacturing 
Industry
It is quite obvious that there is a very 
significant degree of foreign control o f the 
industry. The official Australian Bureau of 
Statistics figures show foreign control for 
1972-73 to have been 34.3 per cent, and of the 
largest 200 enterprise groups, 87 were foreign 
controlled. (4) Foreign control would 
obviously have increased since then, because 
the Foreign Investment Review Board 
statistics show that in the period 1977-79 
there were 137 acquisitions of Australian 
companies by foreign companies where 
Australian control was lost in the 
manufacturing industry, valed at $296 
million, and a further 264 involving a loss of 
Australian ownership. (5) Of course, for 
particular segments of the industry foreign 
control is much higher, including motor 
vehicles, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
transport equipment, and basic metals.
This characteristic is closely related to the 
fact that within the industry there coexists a 
small group o f very large corporations, and a 
larger number of small and medium-sized 
com panies. The latest concentration  
statistics published by the ABS for 1977-78 
show that the largest 200 enterprise groups 
accounted for 51 per cent of value added, 
while the remainder was accounted for by 
20,315 enterprise groups. A significant point 
to note about the statistics is that while the 
share of the largest 200 has remained 
relatively stable since 1972-73, the total 
number of enterprise groups in the industry
declined by over 10,000 in the period. (6)This 
is a clear indication o f the process of 
rationalisation and restructuring that is 
taking place in the industry.
T h e se  tw o  s e c to r s  w ith in  the 
manufacturing industry have been referred 
to by Galbraith as the planning and market 
sectors. The planning sector is where the 
corporations are very large and have a 
substantial degree of control over their 
environment, and the market sector is where 
corporations are much smaller and 
competition is more prevalent. Any national 
industrial policy must take account of the 
existence of these two sectors within the 
manufacturing industry, since policies 
appropriate for the largest firms may not be 
at all appropriate for the smaller companies, 
and vice versa.
The characteristics of foreign control and 
concentration are related in that foreign 
controlled firms tend to be among the largest 
firms in the economy, and tend therefore to 
be involved in long-term planning of their 
operations. As the OECD statistics indicate, 
there is a link between foreign control in a
TRANSNATIONALS AND AUSTRALIAN MANUFACTURING 9
sector and the level of concentration, and 
that in Australia in manufacturing industry 
those enterprises under foreign control tend 
to be on the average much bigger than the 
domestically controlled companies. (7)
As John Alford has pointed out, it is these 
corporations which are the most influential 
in the process of restructuring in the 
manufacturing industry. Because of their 
ability to control their environment, they can 
plan years ahead: how much money will be 
invested by the corporation, how much 
installed capacity it will have, what types of 
products it will be producing and in what 
locations, the types of capital equipment it 
will need and the types of training required, 
how much it will spend on advertising and 
marketing, and what contingency plans it 
has for changes in the economic and 
social/political environment. All of these 
form part of a coherent corporate plan. (8) 
Plans will already be on the books in a large 
number of large corporations in Australia 
relating to all of these aspects now, including 
details of proposed plant closures and 
investment decisions. The future o f 
Australia’s manufacturing industry is 
already being decided, and it is certainly not 
by governments or labor.
There is another characteristic of the 
industry that requires some mention, the role 
of technology. This is a crucially important 
factor since it relates to the types of 
industries that Australia would retain in the 
future.
A variety of studies from all over the world 
have shown that the control of the world’s 
technology has been privatised, and that 
most of the research and development is 
carried out by large corporations, most of 
which are based in Western Europe, Japan or 
the United States. UNCTAD has been 
discussing for years the problems of the 
transfer of technology to underdeveloped 
countries and has consistently pointed out 
that technology is used to benefit the rich 
countries and their corporations at the 
expense of the underdeveloped countries. In 
particular, it has shown how countries with 
little indigenous research and development 
capacity become technologically dependent.
Australia is a technologically dependent 
country, and the research and development 
that is conducted in this country is 
substantially controlled by foreign
corporations. As the Senate Standing 
Committee on Science and the Environment 
pointed out in its report, more than 60 per 
cent of the funds for R & D performed in 
Australia by business enterprises employing 
more than 150 people in 1973-74 came from 
foreign-controlled enterprises, and of the 
royalty and technical payments 94 per cent 
were paid overseas, half to related foreign 
enterprises. (9) In the last decade Australia 
paid out $665 million in such payments 
overseas. As the Committee stated:
High levels o f foreign ownership debilitate 
domestic capacity for R & D. A high level of 
foreign ownership of large companies has 
increased A ustralia ’s dependence on 
technology importation.
Hence it will not be the government, or 
labour, which decided what sort of industries 
we have in Australia, or the technology used 
in those industries. As the underdeveloped 
countries have strongly argued inUNCTAD 
and elsewhere, it is the transnational 
corporations which decide which countries 
get industrialised, how they industrialise, 
and what the costs of this process will be. 
Which brings us back to our old friend 
“ comparative advantage” , and I think it will 
become obvious in the next section that it is 
not the comparative advantage of Australia 
or any other nation which is changing, but 
the com p a ra tiv e  a d v a n ta g e  o f  the 
corporations, which armed with massive 
financial and technological resources are 
reorganising and transforming the world 
economy and the role of particular countries 
in it.
The Changing World Economy
With the development of the transnational 
corporation in the post World War II period 
th e  w o r ld  e c o n o m y  u n d e r w e n t  a 
fundamental structural transformation. 
Now a very significent proportion of world 
trade and investment is undertaken by these 
giant corporations, and they have succeeded 
in establishing and consolidating a new 
international economic order.
One of the most important developments 
in the recent past has been the evolution of 
what has become known as a new 
international division o f labour. The 
previous regional divisions of the world into 
the industrialised centres and the non­
industrialised peripheries are being 
superceded, as some of the underdeveloped'
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countries increasingly become the location 
sites of manufacturing industries, controlled 
by foreign capital and producing for the 
world market. What this implies is a world­
wide relocation of manufacturing industry, 
which is having, and increasingly will have, 
serious consequences for the lives of people 
all over the world. A process o f de­
industrialisation is taking place in the 
formerly industrialised capitalist countries, 
including Australia.
The large corporations have found that by 
relocating in these low wage countries, and 
playing governments o ff  against one 
another to extract maximum concessions, 
they can increase profitability on a world 
basis. The consequence is the developmentof 
global industries, in which production, 
investment, distribution, marketing and 
advertising are done on a global basis by 
corporations based in the developed 
capitalist countries. So not only do the large 
corporations in an industry plan years ahead 
but they also plan on a world-wide scale. This 
makes national control very difficult, even if 
the political will exists.
One of the favored areas for investments 
by the transnational corporations is the 
Asia-Pacific region. We have all heard of the 
so-called “export miracles” of South Korea, 
Singapore and Hong Kong, which have 
followed export-oriented industrialisation 
strategies for well over a decade. The other 
low—wage countries of Asia are being 
integrated into the global manufacturing 
strategies of the corporations at the present 
time. Because of Australia’s proximity to 
Asia, and its rather unique position in the 
area as a relatively affluent country, we are 
lik e ly  to be s tro n g ly  a ffe cted  by 
developments in the region.
A variety of international organisations 
are now discussing the coming “ boom” of the 
Asian-Pacific region. As a Far Eastern 
Economic Review writer stated:
With its high growth potential, the Pacific 
region will offer powerful leverage in solving 
many problems that confront the world 
economy today through multilateral co­
operation, expansion o f international trade 
and effective development and useof various 
resources. (10)
A Pacific Basin Economic Committee was 
formed some 13 years ago, with the objective 
of promoting international trade and
investment in the region. However, a 
number of other writers have pointed out 
that essentially the Asian-Pacific region is 
being increasingly integrated into a world 
system which continues to be dominated by 
the developed capitalist countries and their 
transnational corporations. The strategy 
has been referred to as the Pacific Rim 
Strategy.
This strategy involves the reorganisation 
o f the Asian-Pacific region into four 
interrelated tiers. The first involves the 
United States and Japan, which act as the 
providers of capital and technology; the 
second Australia, New Zealand and Canada 
as suppliers of foodstuffs, raw materials and 
energy; the third the cheap-labour countries 
which will follow export-oriented strategies 
of industrial and agricultural development; 
and fourthly, China and the other socialist 
countries of the region. It is clear that with 
the evolution of such a strategy, which is 
being formulated in the boardrooms of the 
transnational corporations and other 
international organisations like the 
Trilateral Commission, that Australia will 
progressively and systematically be de­
industrialised, since its role in the emerging 
new international economic order is not as a 
producer o f a wide range of industrial 
products. We will revert to a country full of 
sheep-runs and mines, a point observed even 
in 1929 by the Brigden Report:
The maximum income per head for 
Australia would probably be obtained by 
reducing it to one large sheep-run.
One of the essential prerequisites for such 
a strategy is a regime of free trade and it is 
not at a ll co in c id e n tia l that the 
transnational corporations are the most 
ardent advocates of reduced protection and 
trade liberalisation. For the most profitable 
integration o f their production on a global 
basis, transnational corporations require 
reductions in tariffs and q uotas and they and 
their handmaidens, the economic profession, 
have constructed elegant theories to “ prove” 
that free trade will increase welfare and lead 
to an efficient allocation of resources. What 
we are seeing in Australia at the present time 
is economic thuggery: the Australian 
population is being bludgeoned into 
accepting a future which involves the 
dismantling of manufacturing industry, the 
rationalisation of other industries, and
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c o n t i n u o u s  a n d  h i g h  l e v e l s  o f  
unemployment.
De-industrialisation
Part of this de-industrialisation process 
takes place through the movement of 
Australian and Australian-based companies 
“offshore” to other countries. Once this 
process begins, the logic of competition 
forces all companies to follow suit or be 
eliminated. How can an Australian company 
paying Australian wages compete with the 
subsidiary of a transnational corporation in 
the Philippines or Indonesia, equipped with 
the latest technology, and paying wages 10 
per cent of those here? Unless protection is 
maintained, and even increased, it can only 
survive by going overseas itself. It has been 
estimated that there are at least 600 
Australian companies operating overseas, 
particularly in South East Asia. (11)
The ABS statistics also give an indication 
of the acceleration of this offshore movement 
of companies. In the last decade total 
investments overseas by companies in 
Australia amounted to $1,656 million; $918 
million of this was invested after 1974-75.
(12) These companies in their overseas 
operations either produce for the local 
markets in these countries, or establish 
operations to export back to the Australian 
market. The pressure of competition from 
these imports forces the companies 
remaining in Australia to substantially 
rationalise their operations and hasten the 
introduction of new technology to replace 
workers. We have already seen this in the 
textile and clothing and footwear industries.
The transnational corporations, and their 
mouthpieces in the government, the 
econom ics profession and the press, 
however, tell us that this will improve the 
allocation o f resources and increase 
community welfare. The improved allocation 
of resources is supposed to result because 
capital and labour are freed to move to other 
more productive areas o f the economy 
(although exactly where is rarely ever 
specified). Community welfare is supposedly 
increased by cheaper prices (it is always 
assumed that lower costs of production for 
f i r m s  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  r e s u l t  in 
correspondingly lower prices and not 
increased profits).
A number of studies have attempted to 
calculate the effects o f  the newly-
industrialising countries’ exports on the 
developed countries, and particularly on 
employment. The most recent is that of the 
OECD. Although the report argued that the 
net employment effects are relatively small, 
it argued that there could be quite 
substantial gross employment losses in some 
sensitive industries, and that these would be 
particularly concentrated in certain regions 
and certa in  ca teg ories  o f  w orkers, 
particularly relatively unskilled women. It 
pointed out that in times of very slow, or 
negative growth of total employment, such 
gross changes could represent “ a formidable 
adjustment problem as they call for a 
massive occupational and geographical 
redistribution of people actually involved” .
(13) This point was also made by the 
Crawford Committee.
The best examples of this process in 
Australia come from the textiles and 
clothing and footwear industries, and the 
automobile industry. As most of you will 
probably be aware, the clothing and textiles 
industries have suffered serious declines in 
employment in recent years, combined with 
plant rationalisations, company mergers, 
and an increased flow of cheaper Asian 
imports. The share of imports in the 
Australian domestic market has risen 
considerably, and now accounts for over 37 
per cent of the textile market and over 20 per 
cent of the clothing and footwear market. 
Both industries employ large numbers of 
women workers: over 40 per cent of textiles 
and over 75 per cent of clothing and footwear. 
Since most of the workers in the industry 
have skills relevant to the industry in which 
they are employed, many have found great 
di f f i cul t i es  in f i ndi ng  al ternat ive 
employment, particularly since the rest of 
the economy is stagnating.
The development of the world-car concept 
is a different example of the same process. 
The world car involves the adoption of a 
basically common design in a number of 
markets, with interchangeability of parts 
within those markets. Australia, through the 
decisions of General Motors and Ford and 
the other car companies which were made 
years ago, is being locked into an 
international strategy for the production of 
cars on a global basis, and this most 
probably will involve the destruction of 
particular parts of the automobile industry 
in Australia. Some of the companies most
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likely to be affected, such as Repco or Borg 
Warner have already either become 
transnational corporations or were part of a 
transnational corporation initially. 
Australian-based suppliers will find it very 
difficult to survive. Of course, the adoption of 
the world-car concept in Australia 
necessitates the breaking down of the local 
content rules, and the IAC is presently 
examining a number of export-facilitation 
schemes. The closure of the Pagewood plant 
in Sydney is only one part of the process of 
rationalisation and restructuring planned 
by the automotive transnationals. If ever 
there was an industry that required 
systematic and long-term government 
intervention, it has to be the car industry in 
Australia. Because of its crucial importance 
to the rest of the manufacturing industry, in 
that it is a major consumer of products of 
other sectors, it simply cannot be allowed to 
be restructured solely according to the global 
profit-maximisation objectives of the car 
companies. Even if we accept Fraser’s 
defence scenario, surely a diversified and 
integrated automobile industry must be 
developed and maintained.
These are just two examples of industries 
in Australia which are being restructured 
and rationalised in line with the changes in 
the world economy. The question that then 
must be asked is: if Australia is going to be 
de-industrialised, what are we going to 
produce?
What will Australia produce?
The transnational corporations and their 
mouthpieces have argued that Australia 
should produce according to its comparative 
advantage. As the OECD pointed out:
.... because the advanced countries are at 
the frontier o f  changing tastes and 
technological progress, their comparative 
advantage will generally lie in new products, 
processes and technologies. A lso, an 
important part will consist of services and 
know-how, only partly embodied in traded 
goods. Almost by definition, therefore, a 
large part of the comparative advantage of 
the advanced industrialised countries lies in 
products and processes which are hard to 
describe because they are either rather 
intangible or do not yet exist. (14)
We have heard the argument that 
Australia should abandon its labor-intensive
industries and concentrate on capital and 
skill-intensive export- oriented industries, 
although as yet few concrete suggestions 
have been made as to what these should be 
other than mineral-based production which, 
up to now, has not employed large numbers 
of people.
There are a variety of reasons why this 
strategy will be disastrous for Australia. 
Firstly, as I indicated earlier, Australia is a 
technologically dependent country, and it 
does not have a good record in indigenous 
research and development. Since the 
transnational corporations control the 
world’s technology, they are unlikely to 
simply give it away, and so Australia will 
find it very difficult to break into the skill­
intensive industrial areas. This is exactly the 
point that the underdeveloped countries 
have been arguing about for decades — the 
monopoly of technology and R & D by the 
large developed country corporations has 
kept the poor countries in a dependent 
subordinate position. Even now, with the 
process of industrialisation that is taking 
place in some of these countries, it has only 
been made possible by the fact that the 
corporations were able to decompose 
compl ex  product i on processes  into 
elementary segments which can be handled 
by unskilled workers. And this is the tragedy 
of the de-industrialisation process that is 
taking place in Australia. At least in the post 
World War II period, despite the fact that we 
developed a fragmented, dispersed and, to a 
large extent, inefficient industrial structure, 
at least we did industrialise, and this 
required a relatively skilled workforce. Once 
a country loses its industries, it also loses the 
skills of the workers, which are very difficult 
to regain.
Secondly, a large number o f other 
countries are also pursuing such strategies, 
of concentrating on skill and capital- 
intensive industries. But these countries, like 
Sweden, France, the United States and 
Japan are structurally, technologically and 
strategically in a much better position than 
Australia. It is certainly not obvious that if a 
large number of countries attempt to follow 
such export strategies that all will benefit. 
Free trade and international competition 
have always benefited the strong, and there 
is less reason now to think that it will operate 
any differently. Thirdly, those making 
the major decisions about Australia’s future
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have already decided that we will produce 
foodstuffs, raw materials and energy 
products. The most dynamic sector of the 
economy is the mineral industry. It is the 
major area of new investment, both foreign 
and Australian (through the large 
institutions, particularly), and it is the 
recipient of millions of dollars of government 
support, notably infrastructural support. In 
a world of finite and depleted resources, 
Australia is too crucial to the world system 
not to exploit its vast resources. In fact, the 
development of the mineral industry in the 
last decade has begun a process of reversing 
many of the gains achieved in terms of the 
development o f a broadly self-reliant 
affluent society. In the same way that the 
Brigden Report saw the tariff as a means of 
pooling the community’s resources, and 
particularly redistributing resources from 
the export sector to the rest of society, we are 
now seeing a process by which the 
community is supporting the export sector, 
which is overwhelmingly foreign-controlled, 
and concentrated in the politically 
reactionary states of Queensland and 
Western Australia. The result can only be a 
severe polarisation of Australian society, 
as the process of uneven development 
inherent under capitalism proceeds. The 
more that manufacturing industry is 
dismantled and the more reliant we become 
on imports, the more will the mineral and 
energy-based exports need to be increased, 
necessitating even greater distortions of the 
industrial and social structure.
Conclusion
As I think it is clear, I see a gloomy future 
for Australia. Unless the process is checked 
by the forces of labor in this country, 
Australia will be restructured in the interests 
of international capital. Manufacturing 
industry will be dismantled, other sectors of 
the e c o n o m y  wi l l  be s u b j e c t  to 
rationalisation and the forces o f the 
technological revolution, and millions of 
dollars of the society’s resources will be 
poured into expanding mineral and energy 
based production which will be fine for the 
balance of payments but contribute little to 
increasing the welfare of the mass of the 
population. I will conclude with a quote from 
Manning Clark:
In the nineteenth century Australians
enjoyed the reputation of being in the 
vanguard of human progress; they were 
often the pioneers in the introduction of 
bourgeois democracy, and rather boastful 
about it. By contrast, in the twentieth 
century Australians seem to have missed the 
bus carrying humanity into the future. 
Australians are no longer the pathfinders, 
but rather the men of the army in the rear .... 
We had the institutions and the values to 
promote the use of parts o f our country as 
quarries for foreign powers, but neither the 
institutions, nor the inclination, nor the 
belief to make our country a paradise for the 
people.
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THE 
WEST 
AND 
SOUTH 
AFRICANS 
TRADE UNIONISM
Jonathan Bloch and Barry Cohen
The South A frican working class 
represents a unique process in the history of 
Africa. Because South Africa developed a 
much higher level of productive forces than 
occurred elsewhere on the continent, the 
creation of a massive African proletariat has 
been a crucial feature in the evolution of the 
state. Throughout this century, the country’s 
ruling class has felt compelled to base its 
political calculations on the constantly 
expanding presence of African workers in 
the cities and rural areas.
With the discovery o f gold and diamonds 
in the nineteenth century, the South African 
economy was hurled into the international 
capitalist system. In particular, investment 
by foreign capital since the 1920s into the 
manufacturing sector led to the growth of a 
large urban working class. Due to the super­
exploitation of cheap and poorly organised 
black labor, foreign capitalists enjoyed 
returns on their investment which ranked 
among the highest in the world. At the same 
time, the increasing integration of the 
country’s economy with world capitalism 
made it increasingly subject to the vagaries
of the world market and the influence of the 
major imperialist powers.
Apartheid is fundamentally a system for 
the control of black labor. Extraordinary 
wealth extracted from the virtual forced 
labor of Africans enabled the ruling class to 
accord special privileges to the white 
working class and, in this way, to obtain its 
collaboration. Yet, in the face of massive 
state repression exercised by the South 
Af r i can  state,  b lack workers  have 
continually waged struggles to improve their 
most elementary living conditions. Both 
foreign and domestic capital have long 
realised that their substantial wealth and 
investments would be threatened if they 
failed to contain the development of a 
militant black trade union movement.
P ost-w ar developm ents
Shortly after the assumption of power by 
the National Party in 1948. the government 
embarked on implementing one of its main 
political goals of smashing the organised
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sections o f the working class. In 1953, it 
introduced the Native Labor Act which 
denied official recognition to African trade 
unions and declared all strikes by African 
workers to be illegal. In a further extension of 
apartheid logic, the Act prohibited unions 
with white, colored and Asian members from 
accepting African workers. In this way, the 
government hoped to complete the 
segregation of South Africa’s working class. 
The capitulation o f the registered unions to 
this legislation was to exert a lasting impact 
on the class struggle in South Africa.
Concomitant with the state's attack on 
African trade union rights, the international 
labor movement started to become involved 
in the organisation o f South African 
workers. In 1963, the British Trades Union 
Congress paid its first visit to South Africa. 
Realising that Britain has always been the 
largest overseas investor in the country’s 
economy, the TUC has historically 
articulated a chauvinistic policy towards 
black workers. It has firmly believed that 
black militancy must be defused in order to 
protect important British investments and 
trade.
The TUC had given its support to the 
South African Trade and Labour Council 
(SATLC) which included African members 
in the 1940s. After its visit, the TUC 
delegation recommended that “ in the greater 
interest and urgent necessity of unity” , the 
white trade unions should apply apartheid. 
The TUC, therefore, was instrumental in 
killing SATLC in favor o f a South African 
Trade Union Council which excluded 
Africans. This body was later reorganised as 
the Trade Union Council of South Africa 
(TUCSA) and has always maintained close 
ties with the TUC.
In March 1955, the non-racial South 
African Congress ofTrade Unions (SACTU) 
was formed. Derived from dissident SATLC 
unions along with the Council of Non- 
European Unions, it was tied to the Congress 
Alliance whose main organisational form 
was the African National Congress. SACTU 
em erged as the on ly  trade union  
organisation which stressed the interaction 
between political and economic issues.
Western imperialist interests and asection 
of the-A frican  petit bourgeoisie were
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unhappy about the political direction which 
SACTU and the ANC were taking. In 1958, 
two representatives of the International 
Confederation o f  Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU) visited South Africa to establish 
closer ties with the unions there. They 
advised SACTU to break its ties with the 
ANC and the communist-backed World 
Federation of Trade Unions. When SACTU 
refused to do so,, the ICFTU branded it 
“ communist”  and refused to lend any 
support to SACTU’s campaign to organise 
African workers.
In the meantime, the Americans were 
actively involved in splitting the ANC, and 
by 1959, their efforts contributed to the 
creation o f the rival Pan-Africanist 
Congress. In the trade union sphere, the 
Federation of Free African Trade Unions 
(FOFATUSA) was founded in late 1959 by 
various African unions which had not 
affiliated to SACTU. FOFATUSA was 
closely allied with the PAC and strongly in 
opposition to SACTU. It proclaimed: “We are 
interested in industrial politics and the 
welfare of the worker and not in party 
politics” .
FOFATUSA was directly affiliated with 
the ICFTU which provided it with £30,000 in 
funds. By 1962, it had twenty affiliated 
unions and approximately 36,000 members. 
Following the decision taken by TUCSA in 
1962 to permit the affiliation o f “properly 
constituted” African unions, some of the 
largest unions in FOFATUSA decided to 
apply for affiliation with TUCSA. Partly 
because of this development and also 
because some o f its founding unions had 
ceased to exist, FOFATUSA’s strength 
declined. Finally, in 1966, it was disbanded 
and its remaining unions were advised to 
affiliate to TUCSA. Its first president, Jacob 
Nyaose, established an “ exile headquarters” 
in Ethiopia where he engaged in various 
reformist activities. In TUCSA’s view, “ Mr. 
Nyaose is known as an intense South 
African patriot and, during his years in exile, 
consistently counselled Black Africa to seek 
change in the Republic through persuasion 
and contact rather than confrontation” . (1)
Meanwhile, SACTU which probably 
reached its peak in 1961 with over 53,000 
members and 46 unions, suffered increasing 
repression. In particular, its leadership was
either banned, exiled or murdered. By the 
mid-1960s its internal organisation had 
seriously declined and in 1967, it decided to 
go underground. It currently receives funds 
from the WFTU, some East European 
governments, the World Council of Churches 
and Dutch trade unions. Furthermore, 
SACTU is the only trade union movement 
recognised by the International Labor 
Organisation. Although some o f SACTU’s 
members died in detention following the 
political upheavals o f 1976, it is beginning to 
show signs o f internal revival.
The quiet 1960s
The decade o f the 1960s was essentially a 
period when workers’ struggles in South 
Africa were in relative abeyance. The 
numerous Sharpeville events o f 1960 
produced a deep demoralisation among the 
non-European sectors of the working class, 
lik e  other capitalist economies, South Africa 
experienced the tremendous econom ic 
expansion of this boom period. The absence 
of independent trade unions gave the state 
the power to dispose of labor in any manner it 
wished to do so. Imperialist states considered 
South Africa to be not only an exceptionally 
good investment area, but also a valuable 
bastion for the preservation o f western 
interests in an inherently unstable region. (2) 
As a result, the South African government 
felt very confident and acted accordingly.
The most notable western involvement in 
the trade union sphere during this period 
originated from Germany. The DGB, the 
German national trade union federation, 
became active in the mid-1960s when it 
established close links with TUCSA. It 
helped TUCSA create an African Affairs 
section to deal with research, public 
relations, and trade union organising among 
African workers.
TUCSA aimed to weaken support for any 
trend towards a political movement among 
the workers. It constantly stressed an anti­
communist line and urged black trade unions 
to avoid political involvement. For example, 
TUCSA opposed all forms of international 
boycotts of South African goods.
In a number of cases, trade unions were set 
up in opposition to existing SACTU unions. 
For instance, the Sheetmetal Workers’ 
Union, now called the Engineering and 
Allied Workers’ Union, was given the fullest
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support. The cautious organisational 
program coupled with considerable African 
suspicion o f its motives made African trade 
unions organised by TUCSA rather weak. In 
addition, the costs of organising were very 
high. The British TUC calculated that 
TUCSA was spending 45 Hand for each trade 
union member that it recruited. Given these 
costs, it is clear that the organising program 
was only made possible with the support of 
the DGB.
Today, German involvement assumes a 
somewhat different organisational form. 
The German government funnels money 
through a German Catholic Development 
Fund, Misereor, to the Urban Training 
Project in Johannesburg. More significantly, 
the Freidrich Ebert Stiftung has become 
involved in southern A frican trade 
unionism. High-ranking members o f the 
Social Democratic Party constitute its board 
of directors while its financing derives from 
government, unions, and even business. 
When the SPD is in power, the Ebert Stiftung 
is reportedly used by the German intelligence 
network. (3) During periods o f CDU/CSU 
rule, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation plays 
a similar rule. Information about their 
activities is extremely difficult to obtain. 
However, between 19G3 and 1972, the Ebert, 
Adenauer and the Free Democratic Party’s 
Neumann Foundation received over 269 
million DM, mainly provided by the German 
ministry for economic co-operation.
Eruption in the 1970s
The apparent order and stability o f the 
apartheid system was shaken during the 
1970s when black workers began to assert 
themselves in the face of deteriorating living 
conditions. Mass strikes, like those 
manifested in 1973 by 100,000 workers in 
Durban signalled the start o f a new era in 
black militancy. These were followed by two 
general strikes in 1976.
The state has tried to contain this threat by 
two basic means. Firstly, it has enforced the 
Bantu Labor Relations Act of 1973 limiting 
legally recognised organisation of African 
workers to the factory floor. Secondly, the 
state has reacted brutally against striking 
workers and their leadership; in 1976, 24 
trade union leaders were banned.
Corresponding with this upsurge in militant 
activity, came an intensified involvement by
various western trade union organisations. 
An important institutional conduit to pursue 
their goals emerged through the creation of 
the Urban Training Project (UTP) in 
Johannesburg.
The UTP was formed in 1971 out o f the 
ashes of the African Affairs Department of 
TUCSA which had collapsed in 1969. It 
aimed to help the struggling black trade 
unions which had survived their dumping by 
TUCSA and to extend the government- 
sanctioned worker committee system. 
Leading UTP figures, such as Eric Tyacke 
and Loet Dekker, had previously worked in 
TUCSA’s African Affairs Department.
From their inception, UTP associated 
unions have been characterised by an 
explicitly “non political stance” and have 
sought accommodation within the worker 
committee system. In 1973, however, the 
UTP modified its position on worker 
committees, regarding them now as 
complementary to, rather than as a 
substitute for, trade unions, after pressure 
from the workers.
The UTP has always opposed illegal strike 
action. In 1976, none of the UTP unions 
participated in the mass work stoppages or 
issued statements in support of them. 
Furthermore, the UTP has consistently 
opposed economic boycotts of South Africa, 
arguing that foreign firms could play a 
“valuable role” by raising wages and 
recognising African unions.
UTP leadership has encouraged its 
assisted unions to forge links with the “free” 
labor movement. In its 1976 annual report, it 
noted that “ it is hoped that this encouraging 
trend whereby black union leaders can visit 
and study the union movement in other 
countries will continue” .
In February 1978, a UTP delegation, 
including Clement Moutsho and Leonard 
Sikhakhane attended the AFL-CIO 
conference in Los Angeles. They told the 
American unionists that any withdrawal of 
foreign capital from South Africa would 
primarily harm the black population. An 
AFL-CIO resolution of support for SACTU 
was withdrawn when the UTP leaders 
strongly objected to it. They managed to 
convince the conference that SACTU was 
insignificant and only operated from its 
London exile headquarters.
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The true political nature of the UTP 
emerged following the restriction o f its 
leaders in November 1976. In several 
statements, it stressed UTP’s moderating 
influence over workers and the dangers that 
lay ahead for the status quo because o f the 
government’s action. In its 1976 annual 
report, it declared: “ I f  individuals who 
operate within the South African system of 
law (i.e. the UTP administrators) continue to 
be banned, surely the authorities must 
realise that they are instrumental in 
bringing about economic and political chaos. 
They should know that there are elements 
(i.e. SACTU and other leftwing groups) 
waiting for such opportunities where black 
workers can be used to further their aims and 
objects .... UTP and the Black unions 
(associated with UTP) are first and foremost 
concerned with the building up o f a healthy 
relationship (i.e. a non-conflict one) with the 
employers” .*
Not surprisingly, given UTP’s extremely 
mild political perspective, it has received 
valuable funding from western sources. 
These have included the International 
Metalworkers’ Federation; the German 
Catholic Fund (Misereor; the British TUC; 
Netherlands Reformed Churches; SOSV — 
the Dutch Trade Union Federation for 
International Development Co-operation; 
SVEA — the Swiss Federation o f Christian 
Trade Unions; and CNV — the Dutch 
Confederation o f Christian Trade Unions. 
All UTP-assisted unions are affiliated to the 
a p p r o p r i a t e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  T r a d e  
Secretariats which, in turn, are very closely 
allied to the ICFTU.
The intensified struggles of black workers 
during the 1970s attracted the interest of the 
American labor movement, the AFL-CIO 
was already well prepared to deal with issues 
of African trade unionism. In 1964, it had 
established the African-American Labor 
Centre in New York which carries out 
various programs in 41 African states. Its 
first executive director, until 1974, (3) was 
Irving Brown who had played an important 
and highly controversial role on behalf of 
American imperialism since World War II. 
Originally recruited into the Labor Branch of 
the Office o f Strategic Services — the 
predecessor to the Central Intelligence 
Agency — Brown carried out the crucial task 
o f splintering the opposition of communist 
unions to postwar Marshall Aid in France
and Italy. In his book Inside the Company: A 
CIA Diary, Philip Agee identifies Brown as 
the “ principal CIA agent for control of the 
International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU)” . (4) During the pre­
independence era in Africa, Brown was a 
major instrument of the ICFTU throughout 
the continent in helping nationalist 
movements in waging political opposition to 
European colonialism.
Worried about the radicalisation of 
southern Africa due to the racist policies of 
the white regimes, Brown warned the US 
Congress in 1973: “Unless we of the ‘Free 
World’ can condemn and fight African 
apartheid, there is real danger that liberal 
and non-communist forces will be unable to 
cope in the future with the situation through 
lack o f support and may be superseded 
completely by the totalitarian forces of both 
sides. This will increase the chances of 
opening the door to the very forces which the 
makers of US foreign policy claim is 
threatening the peace o f the world, in so- 
called ‘Wars of National Liberation’ .”
Since the withdrawal of the AFL-CIO from 
the ICFTU in 1969 because of the latter’s 
insufficient anti-communist fervor, the US 
has pursued its own independent strategy in 
regard to South African trade unionism. The 
AALC has generally opposed South Africa’s 
expulsion from the United Nations as well as 
international boycotts and campaigns for 
the withdrawal of foreign investment.
At TUCSA’s 19th Annual Conference in 
1973, Brown declared that “ large funds” 
from the AFL-CIO would be forthcoming if 
proper trade unions for blacks were to be 
allowed. The AALC claims to have "been a 
constant and vocal critic of the whole 
concept o f the repressive and inhuman 
apartheid system”. (5) However, in 1976, the 
AFL-CIO refused to take part in the 
international boycott against South Africa 
called by the ICFTU on the grounds that 
similar actions were not planned against the 
communist bloc. At the same time,Jerry 
Funk, (6) deputy director o f the AALC, 
testified before the US Senate — much to the 
delight o f South A frican  government 
propagandists — that the AFL-CIO 
“recognises th at.... a total economic boycott 
may hurt first and most lastingly the very 
people you want to help, the black, colored 
and Asian workers” . (7)
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By late 1977, however, the AFL-CIO was 
forced to take account o f the gathering 
political storms in southern Africa. Its 
convention urged President Carter to put 
“ intense pressure”  on South Africa and 
Rhodesia to end apartheid. At an AFL-CIO 
executive meeting in February 1978, 
president George Meany described South 
Africa as a “destabilising force” because its 
repressive policies were encouraging Soviet- 
Cuban penetration in Africa. The executive 
called on American corporations in South 
Africa to recognise all “ bona fide” trade 
unions and even urgend US sanctions if 
milder action failed to achieve sufficient 
reforms.
Yet the AALC continues to work against 
any radicalisation o f black trade unionism. 
In October 1978 it convened a meeting on 
Botswana in order to give moderate South 
African trade unions an international forum. 
Despite the opposition of the Organisation of 
A frican Trade Union U nity, African 
delegates from Kenya, Liberia, Saire, Togo, 
Zambia, Lesotho and Botswana attended. 
The meeting resulted in a big split in Pan- 
African trade unionism, largely because o f 
AALC’s resistance to any recognition of 
SACTU.
In a parallel manner, the US government 
has stepped up its activities in the South 
African labor field. In a “confidential” telex 
message sent by the US Embassy in Cape 
Town, in February 1976, to various US 
missions in Africa, it was stated: “ In South 
Africa, (US) Embassy would give first 
priority to the labor field” , in terms of 
training black South Africans. At least 16 
South African unionists have visited the US 
in the last five years from the ranks o f the 
Urban Training Project and TUCSA. (8)
The US Labor Attache at the Consulate- 
General in Johannesburg has a key role to 
play in the overall scheme. According to the 
State Department “it is important that the 
Labor Officer expand his contact with 
unregistered black unions .... and various 
groups involved in upgrading the skills of 
black workers .... and keep in close contact 
w i t h  the  w h i t e - c o n t r o l l e d  l a b o r  
organisations in order to encourage liberal 
elements” . (9) At least, one labor attache who 
has served in Johannesburg has been named 
as a CIA agent. He is Ed McHale who was 
labor attache in Johannesburg in 1972. He
was unmasked during the CIA scandal in 
Australia in 1977. (10)
When disaffected unions associated with 
TUCSA and unregistered unions were 
considering the organisation o f a new black 
trade union federation, they arranged their 
first meeting at the US Information Service’s 
Library in Johannesburg. Much to the 
dismay of certain delegates, they were 
confronted with a film and a lecture by a 
State Department official on American 
unionism.
Western imperialism is searching for a 
“middle force” in its South African strategy 
to contain revolution while liberalising the 
apartheid system. As the crisis deepens, the 
position of the African working class will be 
crucial in determining the outcome of the 
contending political forces in South African 
society. Western governments, and in 
particular the US, are clearly aware that the 
formation o f a moderate pro-western trade 
union movement for blacks will be essential 
in preserving overall western interests in 
South Africa.
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^ECONOMIC NOTES & «
FEARS FOR 
AUSTRALIAN 
MANUFACTURING
During July, the daily press carried a 
num ber o f  w arn in gs on b e h a lf o f  
manufacturing capital about the “ resources 
boom” that is said to be impending. Readers 
have had it put to them that Australian 
manufacturing will be imperilled by the 
impact of greater exports o f raw and 
processed minerals on the exchange rate, 
supposedly by increases in wages due to the 
increased demand for labor by the mining 
and processing industries, that even the 
Treasury now admits the need for 
substantial Australian equity in the 
resources projects to ensure that some o f the 
profits are retained for some Australians, 
and that these profits may not be made 
available for the needed transformation and 
expansion of the manufacturing sector 
(beyond, o f course, the inclusion o f  
processing itself).
But there are problems with which a 
resources boom would confront Australian 
capital remaining in manufacturing that are 
not addressed by these warnings. This set of 
Economic Notes will establish just which of 
the problems are really significant and may 
suggest that very little manufacturing 
outside of mineral processing would be 
sustainable without protection.
There is, to be sure, some short-term 
coincidence o f the interests o f Australian 
manufacturing capital and of workers in 
the continuance of the existing protection of 
manufacturing; but it should not be thought 
that the coincidence of interests goes very 
far. Continuance of protection of the clothing 
industry, for example, has enabled 
“rationalisation” in the form of greater
mechanisation, less employment, less output 
and greater profits. More generally, the 
continuance of protection may be important 
to Australian manufacturing capital only 
insofar as it allows companies to accumulate 
earnings with which to buy into the 
resources projects. Once they have done so, 
they may scrap their existing manufacturing 
plant. And, o f course, the resources projects, 
when they come on line, will not provide 
anything like the employment provided in 
existing manufacturing.
The “ G regory Thesis”
The impact of an expansion o f mineral 
exports on manufacturing through the 
exchange rate has been much discussed of 
late. The discussion commonly refers to Bob 
Gregory o f the Australian National 
University who developed the argument in 
an article published in 1976.(1) The 
argument is that additional export revenue, 
along with an augmented inflow of capital to 
finance part of “the resources boom” will so 
add to the demand for Australian dollars 
that the value of the Australian dollar will 
rise substantially in relation to the values of 
international currencies. The international 
currencies have to be exchanged foT 
Australian dollars to be used to finance wage 
payments, purchases o f equipment locally, 
and payments of dividends and interest on 
locally-provided funds. They must be 
exchanged if they are to be deposited with 
various Australian financial intermediaries, 
even if only for the time being. Once the value 
of the Australian dollar increases, however,
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the value to Australian companies o f most 
existing export contracts declines, as do the 
prices — in Australian terms — of imported 
commodities.
Most existing export contracts are written 
in terms of international currencies, not in 
terms of the Australian dollar; so an increase 
in the value of the Australian dollar means 
that an export contract yields fewer 
Australian dollars. A decline in the 
Australian dollar prices o f imported 
commodities provides a considerable benefit 
to importers but depresses the profits of 
Australian companies producing in 
competition with imports, Just how long that 
portion of export revenue that is actually 
foreign-owned is left in Australia obviously 
has an important bearing on the behavior of 
the exchange rate. Clearly, the fears of 
Australian manufacturers and rural 
exporters would be ameliorated if foreign- 
owned revenue were quickly remitted 
abroad; but then the possibility of using the 
foreign-owned funds in some manner to 
finance additional investment in Australia 
would also disappear.
Wages
Some fear of wage rises has recently been 
expressed by the Australian Industries 
Development Association, among other 
organisations. (2) The fear is evidently that if 
construction of various resources projects 
were concentrated within the same four-to 
five-year periods, there would be a sharp 
upw ard pressure on w ages in the 
construction industry and that high wages 
which large transnational corporations 
could afford to pay particular categories of 
skilled workers employed in the operation of 
power stations, smelters and so on would 
need to be paid forthe same jobs elsewhere in 
the economy.
The wordy editor o f the Australian 
Financial Review has added the caution that 
the flow-on o f these last wage increases 
would be stimulated by decisions o f the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. 
(3) However, McGuinness’ understanding of 
the effect o f centralised wage determination 
in Australia may be completely wrong.
What McGuinness likes to suggest is that 
the less productive Australian industries are 
forced by the decisions o f the Conciliation
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and Arbitration Commission (CAC) to pay 
wages that are determined by the ability to 
pay of the most productive industries — or of 
those industries in which wageincreases can 
be most readily passed on through price 
increases. But the CAC may, instead, 
determine aw ards on the basis of the ability 
to pay of the least productive industries — or 
of those in which wage increases cannot be 
passed on. The very fact that, in the view of 
the CAC, it has been plagued by over-award 
payments — that there are widespread over­
award payments — is surely evidence of this. 
That is not to say, of course, that the 
principle of the ability to pay was not 
swamped for a time by the high wage 
increases conceded to public servants by the 
Whitlam government. Left to itself, the CAC 
is unlikely to constitute a threat to 
manufacturers.
Australian Equity
Evidently, even the Australian Treasury 
has come around to the view that it is 
necessary-to specify a minimum degree of
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Australian equity in new investments. (4) 
Under such a “ foreign investment 
guideline” , Australian capital would at least 
receive a portion of the distributed profits 
from the new resources projects. The change 
in the Treasury view has evidently arisen 
from its pessimism about the efficacy of any 
other mechanism for transferring surplus 
generated in mining and mineral processing. 
It is only surprising that the Treasury has 
not become pessimistic much earlier.
Transfers by way o f taxation are severely 
limited by Fraser’s 1976 amendments to the 
Income Tax Assessment Act and by the 
possibility of transfer pricing; and the lack of 
re-investment o f undisturbed mining and 
processing profits in other areas within the 
Australian economy during the past decade 
and a half hardly suggests that anything 
different will occur under similar policies 
during the eighties.
Prescriptions from the point of 
view of capital
In any case, a foreign-investment guideline 
specifying equity participation is not o f itself 
much of a protection for Australian capital. 
Such a guideline can be subverted by the 
practice of disguising foreign shareholdings 
behind ostensibly Australian nominee 
companies. More importantly, however, the 
control o f undisturbed profits can remain in 
the hands o f foreign shareholders even 
where Australian equity is actually well in 
excess of 50 per cent.
It might be possible, in principle, to devise 
a set of policies that would promote the 
transfer of surplus generated in the resources 
projects to manufacturing industries which 
would be profitable without substantial 
tariff protection. McGuinness believes that 
policies of increasing “the skills and mobility 
o f the labour force”  and developing 
manufacturing technologies would do a lot to 
help. (5) Regardless of what such policies 
would mean for Australian workers, it is 
difficult to imagine that they would be of 
much help to Australian capital while 
international capital is in the course of itB 
ow n  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  i m p o r t a n t  
manufacturing industries, while state 
governments continue to compete with each 
other for “international investment projects,
and while any Australian company which 
were to develop a new technology could be 
easily taken over.
Just what sort o f a manufacturing sector 
would be viable in Australia without more 
than the natural protection afforded by 
Australia's geographic isolation is not likely 
to be revealed to anyone in some sort of 
divinely inspired vision. Nor would the 
elimination o f tariffs and other forms of 
protection necessarily make it possible for a 
number o f purely domestic manufacturing 
industries to become significant exporters. 
That is not to say that the costs o f many 
Australian manufacturing industries are not 
substantially increased by tariffs applying 
to the inputs they need. The Industries 
Assistance Commission has calculated that, 
for 26 o f 173 manufacturing industries, the 
costs of protection of inputs amounted to 
more than 40 per cent of the assistance being 
provided to the 26 industries themselves. But 
it was the view of the Crawford Committee 
that the elimination of these costs would be 
an insufficient inducement to persuade 
domestically orientated manufacturers to 
become exporters. In the view of the 
Crawford Committee, manufacturers would 
need export incentives even more generous 
than those currently in force — incentives 
which, at the time of the last budget, were 
estimated to involve an outlay o f $170 
million during 1979-80. About the nature of 
the industries that could become the bright 
new  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  A u s t r a l i a n  
manufacturing capital very little, i f  
anything, is even said.
Further Problems
In the meantime, there are other problems 
developing for manufacturing capital. 
Australian banks were uttering warnings 
over twelve months ago about the danger of 
Australia’s official borrowing abroad. (7) 
Taken at their word, they were evidently 
concerned about the future claims which the 
servicing of foreign official debt will make on 
Australia’s receipts o f foreign exchange. The 
level of overseas borrowing has been 
expanded in order not only to help finance 
the budget deficit but to limit the recent 
depreciation o f the Australian dollar, for fear 
o f the effect o f a greater rate o f depreciation 
on costs of living, costs o f production and the 
Australian dollar returns to exporters. It
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might not appear that debt servicing would 
be a problem once an upsurge in foreign 
investment had properly begun. But it could 
remain a problem if the increased foreign 
investment so destabilised the balance o f 
payments that the federal government had 
to impose import controls from time to time 
in order to ensure that there was sufficient 
foreign exchange available for the servicing 
o f official foreign debt. The balance o f 
payments might well be destabilised by the 
irregularity of ever-increasing remittances of 
profits abroad. In other words, provision of 
foreign exchange for the remittance of 
profits might so threaten the servicing of 
official debt from time to time that it would 
lead to sporadic import controls.
If there were an upsurge in foreign 
investment, the various official borrowers 
might decide to replace foreign debt with 
domestic debt. Presumably, the inflow of 
foreign exchange would substantially 
increase the liquidity of Australian financial 
intermediaries, for the time being, so 
enabling them to buy official securities. 
However, the scope for this solution is limited 
by the fact that many of the official 
borrowers are not directly responsible for the 
management o f the balance o f payments.
Any increase in the degree of instability of 
the balance o f payments itself imposes 
difficulties on relatively small Australian 
capitals involved in the production of 
internationally traded commodities. Either 
industrial capital must itself bear the risk 
that the rate of exchange may suddenly 
become more or less favorable; or it must bear 
the cost of insuring against such a risk by 
trading on the forward exchange market and 
paying the commissions to money-market 
dealers which this involves. An exporting 
company may, for example, insure against 
the possibility o f a rise in the value o f the 
Australian dollar by contracting to sell, at 
some time in the future, the international 
currency in which it is to be paid for its 
exports. The contract would be to sell at 
present prices minus a discount to cover 
commission.
What may also be concerning Australian 
capitalists about the growth o f official 
overseas indebtedness is that the servicing of 
any official debt makes a claim on public 
revenue. Now if tariff revenue were to decline 
with the progressive elimination of tariff
protection, this claim would become more 
important. The urgency of replacing any loss 
in tariff revenue with increased revenue from 
other sources would increase with the extent 
of the debt burden.
Finally, it must be acknowledged that any 
decrease in costs to manufacturers arising 
from a decline in rates of tariff protection of 
inputs will continue to be offset by increasing 
fuel costs as long as the present pricing 
arrangement for crude oil is maintained. In 
ALR’s "Economic Notes” o f March this year, 
it was observed that a pricing arrangement 
less generous but nonetheless still 
com petitively subservient to the oil 
companies could provide considerable 
assistance to existing and potential 
manufactured exports, while also lessening 
the burden on Australian workers.
All in all, the problems which a “resources 
boom ”  would present for Australian 
manufacturing capital are likely to be 
considerable. They reflect not only the 
international orientation of monopoly 
capital in the mining and mineral processing 
industries, but the absurdity of leaving 
investment to the whims o f  private 
enterprise. It is little wonder that Australian 
manufacturing workers are supporting the 
maintenance o f existing tariff protection.
Gavan J. Butler, 
August 11, 1980.
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AUSTRALIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 
COMES OF AGE
Winton Higgins
The bulk of radical social analysis in our 
academic institutions nowadays is done by a 
particular generation of intellectuals. The anti­
war movement, the women's movement and a host 
of other interlocking campaigns of the late sixties 
and early seventies moulded this generation 
politically. With this historically narrow 
experience it presided over a “renaissance” of 
marxism and other radical social theory that, on 
the whole, denied the need for longer historical 
perspectives and dismissed the cautious and more 
painstaking works of their predecessors. Of the 
latter, those who could still find a market were only 
those with tales of working-class advances, 
heroism and spectacular breakthroughs. Such 
tales could be culled out to feed notions of an 
imminent overthrow of capitalism.
That events have proved these notions to be wide 
of the mark should not detract from the real and 
lasting intellectual gains of the new-left era. But it 
is time that we looked through its abstract 
theoretical sophistication, to the static quality of 
its class analysis and political theory. This project 
takes a giant step forward with the publication of 
Bob Connell and Terry Irving's Class Structure in 
Australian History(l) (hereafter CSAH).
To restore dynamism to class analysis Connell 
and Irving have written a history book. But even 
more than most histories written by socialists, this 
one aims to intervene in current problems of social 
analysis and social strategy. This, of course, 
makes it a better (rather than an illegitimate) 
history, although it never sinks to the triviality 
and nit-picking necessary to win the acceptance of 
orthodox historians. But the analytical themes 
breathe life into the narrative, helped along by 
photographs, drawings and a selection of letters 
and documents whereby working and living 
conditions and class outlooks, from the British 
invasion on, can be directly appreciated. And the 
scope of the book’s bibliographic references makes 
it an invaluable resource.
For Connell and Irving, each class in a 
capitalist society forms part of a class structure, 
and it makes no sense to study a class in isolation.
This insight becomes all the more important in 
understanding the history of classes and the 
process of class formation. The success of a class in 
mobilising around its objectives depends partly on 
its ability to hinder rival classes mobilising 
around theirs. In showing how a successful ruling 
class checks working-class mobilisation, the 
authors make good use of existing theory on the 
techniques for hegemony: integration of labour 
leaders in the state, deflecting the labour 
movement into populist or liberal ideas of social 
progress, and providing non-working-class cadres 
to “represent” the labour movement in local 
councils and parliaments. When these techniques 
fail to subvert popular resistance, as they often 
have in Australian history, the state moves in with 
systematic violence.
In concentrating on class mobilisation, 
Connell and Irving seek to overcome a problem 
that plagues class analysis. One group of theorists 
(sometimes called “structuralists") can show how 
classes relate to one another in a full-blown 
capitalist society, but cannot account for how the 
relationships change, and so suggest that the class 
structure reproduces itself without essential 
change. Another group, particularly the "new 
labour historians” , concentrate on one class' 
evolution, or self-formation, but the introduction of 
a notion of change here makes few links with the 
“intractabilities” of class structure. Some, above 
all Poulantzas, develop both aspects without 
overcoming the split between structure and 
history. Classes are located in structures, and they 
act in situations, but how these dissociated 
existences are to be brought together Poulantzas 
does not explain.
Connell and Irving suggest an interdependence 
that can forge the link between structure and 
situation. A class mobilises around economic and 
political objectives that are aimed at particular 
transformations in the structure, and its 
opponent class mobilises to obstruct these 
objectives and substitute its own. What the rival 
objectives are, and the opportunities available to 
each class to realise its programme, depends on
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how the terrain offered by existing structural 
arrangements favours the one class or the other.
How the terrain of existing arrangements 
favours a particular class is not to be understood in 
a static sense. This terrain may have the capacity 
to generate the transformations sought by a 
class, and if so will also supply the impetus for the 
growth of that class and its organisations.^) As 
Marx once put it, capitalist production not only 
creates commodities and surplus-value, but 
capitalists and labourers as well. Connell and 
Irving would also want to add that it spawns 
companies, stock exchanges, chambers of 
commerce and so forth, the many forms of 
capitalist class organisation.
Capitalist society has two centrepieces. The first 
is private property, to exclude social interference 
from the distribution and management of wealth. 
The second is a “free” labour market which allows 
this wealth to expand without limit by enslaving 
the bulk of the population whom the institution of 
private property has already excluded from 
enjoyment and control of social resources.
The story of the Australian class structure thus 
begins with would-be capitalists fighting to 
impose private property and a capitalist labour 
market on a black and white-convict population, 
who were understandably hostile, and a group of 
“plantation capitalists” who frustrated the 
growth of a labour market. Thirty years’ liberal 
use of musket, lash and gallows on tbe blacks and 
convicts, and political intrigue against the 
pastoralists cleared the decks for an infant, but 
now self-generating, colonial capitalism.
It is at this point, however, that capital’s real 
problems begin. Blacks and. convicts were 
extrinsic to capitalism and could be annihilated 
without penalty (or offence to bourgeois morality). 
The new class of wage labourers, on the other 
hand, was generated within the system, and 
indispensable to it. And workers resisted capitalist 
control over the labour process and capitalists’ 
deciding the level of “market” wages, thus 
threatening both private property and the 
operation of the labour market. They also 
contested the state’s championing of capitalist 
causes, and the class itself threatened to melt 
away in gold rushes, appropriation of new 
farmland, and independent crafts. Long periods of 
high employment underpinned the confidence and 
solidarity of working-class mobilisation, and 
made the Australian labour movement in the 
nineteenth century one of the world’s most 
formidable. The issues it struggled over and its 
methods pointed in a collectivist direction.
Defence and maintenance of private property in 
Australia in these conditions proved difficult. On 
an international comparison, the Australian 
ruling class was in a weak position, too weak to 
rely on state repression and armed confrontation
alone. The subtle and complex development of 
class rule in Australia under these adverse 
circumstances, Connell and Irving suggest, laid 
the basis for the resilience and flexibility of 
conservatism in our own time. Their wide-ranging 
research unravels its many strands — use of the 
education system to implant sexist values and 
practices, ensnaring trade union leaders and 
labour politicians in the ideology o f 
developmentalism and the rituals and rewards of 
state office, working up a powerful populist culture 
based on nationalism, racism and militarism, and 
so forth. Each made its contributionm to 
obliterating consciousness of class and blunting 
the edge of working-class organisations.
The Australian ruling class and its state could 
not afford the hypocrisy of a claim to state 
passivity. Long after the establishment of colonial 
capitalism, the state was kept active nurturing it 
with economic assistance, resolution of policy 
dilemmas and internal conflict within the ruling 
class, breaking up working-class communities and 
imposing “law and order” in industrial relations. 
Instability constantly menaced the system and 
elements of the labour movement threatened to 
break out of the web of hegemony.
But so far the working-class challenge to class 
rule has been held off, albeit with nasty moments 
and heavy losses for the defenders at times. In 
accounting for the defeats of working-class 
mobilisation, Connell and Irving rely too heavily 
on the old culprits of economism, reformism and 
bourgeois ideology. They give numerous examples 
of rank-and-file struggles being sold out by 
industrial and political leaderships enmeshed in 
state procedure or intimacy with business 
interests. Social rebellion, such as the larrikin 
pushes, were quickly tamed by populist writers 
and incorporated into a bourgeois-defined 
Australianism. “The fact that the literary 
'larrikins’ ended up as good husbands and 
soldiers, thus accurately reflecting the importance 
of the family and militarism to bourgeois cultural 
containm ent, hardly  encouraged the 
transformation of the pushes into a street army of 
the proletariat.” (p. 191). In both situations, the 
authors suggest that, were it not for the reformist 
and cultural obstacles, these rebellions would have 
gone much further. But to what? We know from the 
book that the police and military resources of the 
state were more than enough to crush isolated and 
politically ill-prepared uprisings.
Theoretically and empirically, Connell and 
Irving’s account of ruling-class mobilisation is 
probably the best produced here or overseas. 
Behind a conventional romanticism ofgrasB-roots 
struggle and denunciation of reformism, however, 
lies afailure to equally systematically seek out the 
roots of working-class mobilisation in capitalist 
society. If the generative capacity of the ruling 
class lies4n the accumulation of capital, wherein
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lies working-class generative capacity, the 
springboard of its successful mobilisation?
The answer, I suggest, is stable full employment, 
what Engels called, more broadly, the destruction 
of competition among workers, which he saw as 
the destruction of the rule of property itself. (3) 
Under conditions of full employment, capital loses 
the ability to inflict slumps and thus undermine 
living standards and labour organisations — the 
preconditions of a capitalist labour market. 
Trade-union membership tends to go up, as does 
electoral support for parties of labour. In tbe longer 
term, full employment proves incompatible with 
private control of investment and labour process, 
and the most recalcitrant economist and reformist 
labour leaders will be forced to accept socialisation 
as the only alternative to mass unemployment. 
For this reason, economism and reformism may 
not be the blind alleys the authors suggest, but 
temporary stages in working-class mobilisation 
towards more basic transformations. Stable full 
employment is the springboard in this process, not 
the whole solution: ruling-class hegemony must be 
overcome in all its aspects.
If this is true, two themes in the later history of 
the labour movement taken up in CSAH need 
further study. One is the demobilising role of 
arbitration on trade unions specifically. The 
authors correctly point out how arbitration tends 
to legitimate workers’ loss of control of the labour 
process and integrate trade-union leaders into the 
state. But arbitration has other far-reaching 
effects, in fixating the trade-union movement in its 
pre-industrial structure, in calling forth a 
particular style of trade-union leadership and a 
typical organisation that suppresses both 
circulation of leaders and communication between 
rank-and-file and leaders. Related to this, the 
movement has never been able to play an 
independent role in wage formation, and has thus 
never formulated, â cô rerent wage-policy, still less 
its own economic strategy. In short, arbitration 
has left the trade-union movement depoliticised 
and incapable of dragging the ALP back to class 
politics.
As Connell and Irving point out, the ALP itself is 
a pre-industrial survival, its ideological roots still 
embedded in late nineteenth-century populist 
radicalism, but a working-class party nonetheless, 
“a product of class mobilisation under hegemony” 
(p. 30). What role could it play (or have played) in 
more successful working-class mobilisation? The 
authors’ suggestion seems to be: very little. Yet 
there was a time, during the second world war and 
in the immediate post-war reconstruction period, 
when the ALP came perilously close to pursuing its 
mummified “socialist objective”. Connell and 
Irving show how Australian conservatism was in 
crisis, and the only danger to the ALP, at the 
height of its popularity, was that of being
outflanked by the Communist Party in the labour 
movement.
For the first time, the ALP began to face the 
implications of stable full employment (“a 
somewhat comprehensive socialisation of the 
investment function” as Keynes hinted darkly in 
the final chapter of The General Theory of 
Employment Interest and Money) and attempted 
to arm itself with the necessary constitutional 
powers and public control of the economy 
necessary to ensure its goal.(4) Its later 
humiliating retreat does not justify the description 
of its post-war reconstruction plans in CSAH as 
“essentially defensive” and lacking an intention 
to take control of production as a whole (p. 286). 
Especially at the present time we need to take some 
care with this period, perhaps the most tragic 
missed opportunity in Australian labour history.
The above is not to suggest that the analysis of 
the labour movement’s weakness in CSAH is 
weak. Given the recent spate of simplistic 
speculation by the social science establishment 
about “what’s wrong with the ALP” , I am in 
danger of damning this book with faint praise in 
saying that it 1b clearly superior to earlier writing 
in this area, Vere Gordon Childe perhaps excepted. 
Its account of the degenerating effects on the ALP 
of a particular style of local government politics 
(involving intimacy with local business, 
speculators and land sharks) and the constant 
seizure of high office in the party by people remote 
from working-class life in all respects, rounds off a 
complex and balanced analysis.
As befits the times, politically this is a sober and 
tough-minded book. The post-war renovation of 
bourgeois hegemony has taken its toll on labour 
mobilisation, especially at the political level. Its 
elements include suburbanisation, privatisation, 
the new economic dependence forged by hire- 
purchase and the influence of television. In the 
present period, many of the traditional resources 
of working-class mobilisation are ineffective or, as 
in the case of the working-class community, all but 
destroyed. But the authors conclude that, while 
classes and their conflict persist, bourgeois 
hegemony is never safe. The brutality of the Fraser 
regime illuminates a vital flaw in its management 
of that hegemony — its lack of any moral 
component. To make that vital flaw into a fatal 
one requires a socialist strategy for mass 
remobilisation and the discovery of new 
organisational resources to propel it.
In sum, CSAH is a landmark in social analysis, 
as well as in imaginative presentation. Don’t miss 
it.
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Structure in Australian History: Documents,
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2. Bob Connell develops the idea of marxism as a 
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(October 1977).
3. The Condition of the Working Class in 
England (Panther, London, 1969), p. 245. Fora
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4. See W. J. Waters, “Australian Labor's Full 
Employment Objective, 1942-5” , Australian 
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(1970).
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The German Revolution of 7978-19
John Perkins
The Ruhr and R evolution , by Jurgen 
Tampke, Canberra: Australian National 
University Press, 1978. Reviewed by John  
Perkins.
The abortive German revolution of 1918-19 
has never attracted the attention its 
significance would appear to merit. In 
Weimar Germany the official attitude was a 
virtual conspiracy of silence, in which the 
events o f the first winter after the World War 
were viewed as a momentary aberration 
from German traditions occasioned by the 
defeat. Under Hitler, the Revolution and the 
“ November Criminals” achieved more 
prominance as objects of vilification. After 
1945, in western Germany interest in the 
subject was limited until the later 1960s 
when members o f the revolutionary student 
body were drawn to the ideas of Rosa 
Luxemburg, These appeared to offer a 
more appropriate model than those of Lenin, 
as did the experiences of more romantic 
although equally tragic figures such as 
Toller and Levine ofthe Munich Soviet. Only 
in the German Democratic Republic, where 
the KPD (Communist Party of Germany) 
that emerged from the revolution provides 
the event with the area o f historical 
antecedence akin to the role o f the equally 
abortive Revolution of 1848-49 in the Federal 
R epu b lic , h as the su b je c t  rece ived  
considerable attention.
The works that have hitherto appeared 
present one or other of four interpretations of 
the Revolution. Firstly, there is what might 
be called the orthodox bourgeois or western
interpretation which favours the role o f the 
Majority SPD in averting “ Bolshevism” and 
blames the “ putschist” approach o f the 
Spartacista for the rapid recovery of the 
counter-revolutionary forces and for the 
a b s e n c e  o f  m ore  t h r o o u g h g o in  g 
dem ocratisation o f the bureaucracy, 
judiciary, and military of the subsequent 
Weimar Republic, Secondly, there is the 
National Socialist interpretation which 
places the blame for the military collapse of 
1918 on the “ November Criminals” . From 
the events o f 1918-19, the Nazis drew the 
conclusion o f the primacy of domestic policy. 
In other words, in contrast to Wilhelmian 
Germany where an aggressive foreign policy 
functioned as a means of subsuming 
domestic conflict, the aim in the Third Reich 
was to ensure a solid internal basis of unity 
for an expansionist foreign policy.
A third interpretation, first presented by 
Arthur Rosenbaerg in the early 1930s, is that 
the Revolution offered a chance o f a third 
course between the limited social and 
poli tical achievements of the Weimar 
Republic and a transformation along the 
lines of Soviet Russia. Unfortunately, 
however, this opportunity was missed by the 
Majority SPD leadership who, in allying 
themselves with the military leadership and 
the Free Corps (Freikorps), ensured the 
survival o f the Reaction. Finally, to 
historians of the GDR the Revolution also 
amounted to a lost opportunity, which 
nevertheless demonstrates the possibilities 
o f revolution in advanced industrial
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countries and the necessity for a strong, well- 
organised and competently led communist 
party to successfully exploit those 
possibilities.
In the work under review, Dr Tampke sets 
out to analyse the background and the course 
o f the revolution in the Ruhr industrial 
reg ion  in the l ight  o f  the var ious 
interpretations that have been made. In 
doing so he remedies a serious deficiency in 
the available English-language accounts in 
which the Ruhr, the most highly-developed 
region of modem industry in Europe and a 
stronghold of revolutionary forces, is 
relatively neglected. The author is concerned 
to explain how, within a few weeks o f ‘the 
collapse o f the old order’ , the left in the Ruhr 
was able to mount a serious challenge for 
power; and why unrest and revolutionary 
actons were more evident in some parts of the 
region than in others.
The basis o f the analysis is a division of the 
Ruhr into three districts which differed in 
terms o f  the form o f socio-econom ic 
development before 1918 which in turn 
determined contrasts of experience during 
the Revolution itself. In the old-established 
coalmining district o f the eastern Ruhr, the 
Bochum-Gekenkirchen-Dortmund area, the 
miners ex per ienced  a con s iderab le  
deterioration in their formerly privileged 
status with the relaxation of state control 
over the industry between 1851 and 1865. In 
response the district emerged as an early 
stronghold of the SPD and o f the socialist 
trade unions. Thereafter, the rate o f 
industrial and urban growth, while 
substantial in the context of Germany as a 
whole, was lower than in other districts o f the 
Ruhr. Consequently, a high proportion o f the 
labour force came from relatively short- 
distance migration, rather than from the 
reserve army o f displaced agricultural labour 
in Germany’s eastern territories. In addition, 
th e  p r o n o u n c e d  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  
administrative organs and service industries 
in the towns o f the eastern Ruhr provided 
substantial white-collar employment.
The eastern Ruhr by 1914 was relatively 
homogenous ethnically, had a more 
graduated  soc ia l  h i e rarch y  with a 
substantial lower middle class, and a well- 
established SPD tradition controlled by the 
party and union bureaucracies. During the 
war itself the power of the Majority SPD 
functionaries was further enhanced with the
gaining o f control of the remaining party 
newspapers and key positions from the USP 
(Independent Socialist Party) that split from 
the SPD during the War. Consequently, 
during the Revoltuion power in the eastern 
Ruhr was firmly in the hands of the 
“moderates” of the Majority SPD, The latter 
managed to effectively limit the scope and 
objectives of the labour movement and, by, 
the end of December 1918, ‘the emphasis in 
the eastern Ruhr had shifted from revolution 
to political electioneering’, which was the 
forte of the Majority SPD.
The limited objectives in the eastern Ruhr 
are illustrated by the “ Poster proclaiming 
the revolutions” in the town of Dorsten, 
which is published without translation. The 
poster announced the establishment o f a 
Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council in the town 
on 10 November, 1918, to “ maintain the 
public peace, security and order to the fullest 
extent” . Citizens are urged to “ carry on with 
their business as usual” , severe punishment 
is threatened for instances of unrest and 
looting, children and youths under 17 years 
o f age are informed to be off the streets by 7 
pm, and no assembly shall obstruct or 
disturb traffic. ”
In the southern Ruhr district, in the 
Solingen-Remscheid-Dusseldorf area o f the 
metal trades, modern industrialisation also 
commenced relatively early in the 19th 
century. Metalworkers acquired a higher 
social status and incomes than the miners of 
the eastern Ruhr, altough this did not 
prevent the emergence of a radical labour 
movement. During the war this area 
developed as a stronghold o f the USP. 
However, the ‘vigorous course’ of the 
Revolution ended in December 1918 with the 
occupation o f a large part of the district by 
the British Army, which supported the 
Majority SPD, and with the speedy recovery 
of the confidence o f the substantial middle 
class.
It was in the third district, the district of 
the western Ruhr, centred on Hambom that 
the Revolution reached its apogee as a mass 
movement o f the working class. This district 
was characterised by particularly rapid 
growth from the later 19th century. In 1870 
Hambom was a village. By 1890 it had becme 
a town of some 28,000 inhabitants. By 1914, 
however, it had emerged as a city of over 
120,000. A  large proportion of the population 
consisted of migrants from the agrarian east,
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including a number o f Poles. Consequently, 
the growth of the influence of the SPD, which 
had never made significant inroads in rural 
Germany, was delayed and limited up to 
1914. In fact, Hamborn was one of the first 
cities in which syndicalism gained a 
following. Here, the Revolution was most 
spontaneous and protracted and the KPD 
made the most ground.
Within the division of the Ruhr into 
districts Tampke singles out Essen for 
special attention as the location o f an 
attempt to establish workers' control of the 
coal industry, ‘the only time between 
November 1918 and the spring o f 1919 that 
major steps were taken to push to revolution 
beyond the stage o f mere constitutional 
change’. In turn this has become the basis of 
the ‘third way’ interpretation, that the 
Revolution offered the prospect of a middle 
course between “ Bolshevism” and the 
coalition of the SPI) with the Reaction. The 
Essen model failed through the ‘vagueness 
and confusion1 of its protagonists, through 
the fact that to the Majority SPD it was 
merely window dressing, and through the 
failure o f the USP and the KPD to conquer 
power in Berlin.
Overall, Tampke presents an absorbing 
narrative oftheeventsofl918-19in the Ruhr, 
which is marred only by the absence of a map 
to enable readers to orient themselves in 
the narrative’s mobile account and by the 
failure to translate a number of German 
expressions and names of institutions. The 
progress of the Revolution is convincingly 
presented in the context of the social and 
econom ic development o f the region, 
although at times the relating of events in 
1918-19 to such developments is rather 
simplistic. The work also presents a much- 
needed antidote to the numerous accounts 
that play down the revolutionary nature of 
the situation and of events in Germany at 
that time and attribute revolutionary actions 
solely to leftwing “ agitators” . The essential 
weakness, however, rests in the analysis of 
the reasons for the failure of the Revolution.
The crucial absence of ‘a united and 
competent’ revolutionary leadership is noted 
by Tampke, although he considers that this 
would only have ‘seriuously troubled the 
social-democrat conservative alliance’. 
Moreover, even if ‘a properly led and widely 
supported Comm unist Party’ had existed it is 
considered that the Allies would have
intervened m assively to prevent the 
appearance of a socialist Germany. In 
addition, Tampke offers as a reason for the 
failure ‘the fact that recent works on 
revolutions question the feasibility of a 
rev o lu tion  o ccu rr in g  in advan ced  
industrialised countries’ . The sources of 
support for this ideological position 
translated into an universal truth are 
Hannah Arendt and Krishnar Kumar. The 
possibilities o f a ‘third way’ are dismissed on 
the basis o f the conception of workers’ 
control and the institutions of workers’ 
council having little real understanding and 
following amongst the working class.
What does emerge from this study is the 
equivocal role played the Majority SPD, 
which utilised its position at the head of the 
Revolution essentially to destroy it. The 
alliance of the Majority SPD leadership with 
the remnants of the old army leadership and 
the reactionary Free Corps (Freikorps), 
instead of allowing the formation of a Red 
Army, ensured the distruction of the 
Revolution and the survival of a Reaction 
that gathered confidence and strength 
during the Weimar Republic. This decision 
reflected the remarkable ability o f the SPD 
lead ersh ip  before  1914 to com bin e 
revolutionary rhetoric with reformist 
practice. The excesses committed by this 
alliance against the left — the suppression of 
strikes and uprisings and the murders 
committed by the Free Corps — more than 
justify the hostile attitude of the KPD 
towards the SPD in the Weimar era. 
Nevertheless, this has not prevented a 
number of historians from attributing the 
Nazi assumption of power in 1933 to the 
hostility of the KPD towards the SPD.
The CHILEAN MALAISE
Marco Calamai
The follow ing is an abridged version o f  an 
article by M arco Calam ai in the June 6 issue o f  the 
Italian Com m unist Party journal Rinascita. It 
g ives  a rare account o f  conditions inside Chile 
today and o f  the various politica l trends within the  
opposition to the P inochet m ilitary junta.
On return from  Chile: June. ...Santiago 
would astound anyone like me, returning 
after three years. The centre is all lit up, shop 
windows full of goods from all over the world, 
traffic as in European cities, new buildings
— even skyscrapers, A completely different 
picture from the Santiago of old: sleepy, poor, 
a city typical of the backward and marginal 
third world.
For the regime and the “ Chicago boys” of 
the government, these changes are the result 
of the monetarist (neoliberista) economic 
model. Chile is consolidating its position in 
the international division o f labor: “Exports 
are increasing (not only copper but also non- 
traditional sectors) and foreign capital, after 
years of uncertainity, is at last coming into 
the country.”
But the official glorification of the 
successes of the outright monetarist model 
applied in Chile (with a coherence without 
comparison in the rest of Latin America) 
does not stand up to a closer analysis of the
reality. Just outside the centre of Santiago 
are the signs of mass unemployment and 
underemployment, of a misery not seen in 
Chile for decades which, I was told so often, 
“ represents the real conditions of the great 
majority of the population.”
Two underground Communist militants 
explained to me: “Not only the popular 
classes, the workers and peasant masses but 
also vast intermediate strata, the sectors 
which at first sympathised with the coup (a 
good part o f the Christian Democrat 
electorate) are now expressing their 
repudiation of the regime.”
In recent years, opposition to the 
dictatorship has broadened and only that 
small part of society made rich by the new 
economic policy remains favorable to 
Pinochet. A leader of the Radical Party told 
me that “ this is shown by the uneasiness 
which extends even into the oligarchy and 
the government itself.” The conflict between 
the duros (hard) and the blandos (soft) is
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evident more than ever since the recent 
failure of Pinochet’s trip to the Philippines 
became public. (The dictator Marcos refused 
him entry when he was already on the flight 
from Santiago.) And it is not just a matter of 
clashes in this or that point, but the 
fundamental prospects o f the regime.
The blandos, men of the monetarist policy, 
say that sooner or later the “ free market” 
must lead to policital freedom. And other 
experiences are referred to, such as those of 
Brazil and Spain. Hence the contacts with 
the opposition, in particular with the 
sections more amenable for old or new 
reasons to a compromise with the “ open” 
groups of the oligarchy and the armed forces. 
Is this practical? “The economic policy of 
these forces,” DC president Andres Zaldiver 
told me, “ is at present incompatible with a 
return to full political and trade union 
freedoms. Their model of development 
seriously harms the living standards o f the 
great majority o f Chileans and we are firmly 
opposed to it.” This thesis is repeated by the 
parties o f the Unidad popular, Communists, 
Socialists, Radicals, minor left groups. The 
blandos, according to this analysis have in 
mind a model o f democracia restringida 
(restricted democracy) not much different 
from that of the duros who would like to 
consolidate a reactionary regime of a fascist 
type.
But if there seems to be a common 
analysis, the distance between the left and 
the Christian Democracy is still great. The 
dramatic rifts that led to the military coup 
continue. An agreement between all the 
democratic forces such as that proposed 
repeatedly by the left, particularly the 
Communists, has been recently rejected by 
the DC of Frei. Recent international events 
such as the taking of the hostages in Iran 
and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 
have bought new elements into the polemics 
between the parties. The Communist Party 
has been criticised from a number of sides for 
its positions favorable to the Soviet 
intervention and the rifts already present in 
the Socialist Party have been further 
accentuated.
If the DC appears uncertain by the 
prospects, the left also emerges divided, rent 
by old and new polemics. A general difficulty 
is eveident in the face o f the necessity to 
deepen further the critical analysis of the
Allende period (the errors and the 
limitations which led to the rallying of a 
broad social front amenable to military 
intervention) and to the urgent necessity to 
understand better the profound economic 
and social modifications of these years in 
order to define a strategy o f democratic 
struggle to match the great malaise which 
pervades Chilean society.
Six years after the coup the opposition 
forces must take account of their past as well 
as a present full o f unknowns which were to a 
large extent unpredictable a short time ago. 
Not only has the internal situation changed 
profoundly (“ Chilean society will not be the 
same again,”  says a leader of Mapu obrero y  
campesino), but the international context is 
more than ever thick with worrying 
questions. “The hopes raised by American 
foreign policy in the first two years of 
Carter’s presidency, together with the more 
general international isolation of the regime, 
a process of democratic opening towards the 
convergence o f all the opposition forces 
appear now to be strongly modified,”  admits 
a militant of the Communist Party.
Here in Santiago the sings o f this change 
are to be observed more perhaps than 
elsewhere: and it is eveident how much the 
crisis of detente helps the regime to recover 
an image which has been lacking until now. 
It is just as evident how international events 
make more difficult than before the ties o f 
unity between the parties o f the Unidad 
popular. The serious difficulties o f the 
Socialist Party are significant from this pint 
o f view. If the break between Altamirano and 
Almeida has not had a particular impact 
within the country (the section o f Almeida, 
the closer to the CP o f Corvalan, remains 
largely in the majority) there is still the 
malaise o f criticism, above all among the 
youth, of the traditional alignment of the 
party. “ We are working,” a Socialist 
intellectual who asked not to named told me, 
“ for a new party in which there must be a 
converging o f a number o f forces of the minor 
groups of the Unidad popular, (Mapu, Mapu 
obrero y campesino, Isquierda cristiana) 
with the sections of the Socialist Party which 
believe in a re-forming o f the left.”
A formation mid-way between the two 
strongest parties of the lesft and the 
Christian Democracy? Or is this part o f a 
broader political operation directed towards
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agreement between the DC, the Radicals and 
the left sections more or less close to 
international social-democracy? An answer 
is perhaps premature, but it is evident that 
there is a re-thinking which o.i one way or 
another involves the whole of the democratic 
line-up. And this will be a process of 
reflection which goes beyond the present 
central question of the alliance necessary to 
defeat the dictatorship. With its starting 
point the errors committed during the 
Unidadpopular government there has begun 
an analysis of the structures of the parties, 
the moehod of conducting politics, the 
relationship between base and leading 
groups, the ideological tradition of each 
historical component o f the working class 
and democratic movement.
In the review Analisis (Christian and open 
to more diverse contributions) I read a debate 
on “ P o lit ica l p a rties : doubts and 
challenges” . The analysis sets out from the
years which culminated in the coup of 
September 11, 1973, a date regarded as the 
conclusion of a “political-institutional 
crisis” linked with the “ structure and 
organisation o f  political parties not 
sufficiently institutionalised.” The critical 
judgement on this traumatic period is 
explicit. “The parties were not really able to 
connect themselves with their bases, did not 
live their problems, were not capable of 
taking up their concerns and therefore were 
not true interpreters of their own militants.” 
Analisis asks if this reality has changed. The 
reply is worrying, mainly negative. Even 
today the defects of yesterday prevail, it 
says, the same distance between militants 
and leaders, the same lim itations o f 
“dogmatism and of centralised leadership.”
This reflection has just begun but it will 
develop. The illusion that the regime would 
last only a few years is gone and there is a 
common consciousness that an alternative
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plan can only be born out of a radical 
ideological and organisational renewal o f 
the parties. The dialogue between the various 
forces, the overcoming of the dramatic rifts 
which divided Chilean society and 
culminated in the military coup is closely tied 
to this process. And there are many militants 
in all the parties who deplore the slowness of 
the process of cultural and organisational 
renewal in the face o f the priority need to 
struggle in an adequate way against the 
dictatorship.
Zaldivar went on to say, “Today the real 
opposition is basically represented by two 
parties — we of the DC and the Communists. 
Hence the difficulty o f an agreement with the 
left which would not be understood by our 
militants and which would be used by the 
dictatorship to divide Chilean society anew, 
to justify the authoritiarian option and the 
consolidation of a personal regime.” It is a 
fact, as all the left militants I talked with told 
me, “ that vast sectors o f Chilean society are 
opposed to the regime but at the same time 
fear a return to the situation of the early 
seventies.”
The regime, meanwhile, is looking around 
and hoping that the evolution o f 
theinterantional climate is favorable to its 
program of institutionalisation. Attention is 
focussed above all on what is happening in 
the United States. The attitude of Carter has 
changed, the hostility of much o f the 
American press is not as marked as before. In 
one issue of Ercilia, the weekly closest to the 
positions of the blandos, I read a long article 
about recent international comments on the 
present situation in Chile. The conclusion is 
clear: Chile can emerge from its isolation 
only if it projects an image different from 
that of the first years o f the regime. More 
attention therefore to “ human rights” , 
greater flexbility in policial and above all 
trade union relations.
In Chile now one breathes a different 
atmosphere, one speaks more freely, the 
oppositon can utilise the room for manoeuvre 
and initiative unthinkable a short time ago. 
The nature o f the repression has changed, no 
longer as violent and tragic as it was several 
years ago, more subtle and selective 
(preventative arrests, sackings of suspects.)
What happened on May Day is symbolic in 
this regard. The police made hundreds o f 
arrests to prevent mass participation of
workers in demonstrations organised by the 
democratic trade union movement. But the 
government tolerated May Day becoming an 
important occasion and did not impede the 
several thousand workers and opposition 
cadres who met behind closed doors. The 
main daily paper El Mercurio (linked with 
the “ open” sections) reported it on the front 
page, even naming the unionists who had 
come from other countries for the occasion.
“ Even from this point of view Chile has 
changed,”  a Communist militant maintains. 
“Undoubtedly new spaces for initiative by 
the masses and the democratic political 
forces have opened up. That is shown by 
trade union struggles, stronger than before, 
led by worker cadres of all tendencies from 
the left to Christian Democrats.”
One thing is certain: in Chile there is much 
debate, the newspapers speak explicitly 
about the economic and political situaiton, a 
new ferment is occurring in this country after 
years of fear and terrible silence. I recall 
Franco Spain in the sixties when the 
embarrassment o f the regime became 
evident in the face o f the drive for freedom 
coming from the most diverse sections o f 
Spanish society. A process has been set in 
motion and it will be very difficult to stop it. 
Ercilia published the recent declaration o f 
the Catholic bishops in which they called on 
all Chileans to strive “ to promote a return to 
constitutional normality” , affirming that “ a 
state o f  emergency cannot be made 
permanent” . We are certainly a long way 
from the colapse o f the regime but it is 
nevertheless clear that the elements o f an 
evolution in a democratic direction are 
taking shape.
The tempo and the methods o f this 
evolution are still not predictable. They 
depend in large measure on the capacity ol 
the democratic, progressive and moderate 
forces to develop adequately that critical 
consideration of the past and the present 
which is one o f the most interesting aspects 
o f present Chilean reality.
(Trans, note: “Monetarist” is used in this 
tr ans la t ion  for  the Ita l ian  word 
“ neoliberista” , used to describe the economic 
policies of, for example, Thatcher in Britain 
and Friedman in the USA. This policy relies 
on the maximum freedom o f  private 
enterprise and market forces and a minimum 
of state-intervention in the economy. DD.)
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DISCUSSION
Eric Aarons
Jack Blake’s discussion piece (ALR, No. 74) 
raises vital issues which include, but go beyond, 
Afghanistan.
Referring specifically to Eqbal Ahmad 
(Interview in Afghanistan: Afghanistan: fact - 
opinion analysis, CPA publication), Jack says:
A section of the left has set up fixed criteria for 
granting legitimacy to revolution in a Third 
World country....
I do not agree with everything Ahmad says, but I 
think Jack’s criticism misses the main point, 
Ahmad approves the program of the People’s 
Democratic Party in Afghanistan, as I think we all 
do. But he legitimately points to the dangers in 
trying to implement such a program without 
sufficient mass support, particularly among those 
most affected — the peasantry.
Another section of the left, however, sets up 
criteria which are perilous indeed. Sam 
Goldbloom, for example, writes:
...with a population which is 95 per cent 
illiterate, where the working class is only one 
per cent, where feudalism and the 
fundamentalist Islamic religion has kept the 
people in the dark for ages....this nexus can be 
broken only by a small group drawn.from the 
intellectuals, progressives of various shades, 
including church leaders, and the nucleus of a 
marxist party. (Tribune, May 7, 1980).
While in Viet Nam recently, I had it put to me 
concerning Afghanistan that “ there are two kinds 
of revolution, one from the top and one from the 
bottom” .
I replied that this was the first time I had heard 
such a view advanced by marxists, who always
stressed the vital element of self-emancipation. I 
queried how the Vietnamese revolution could have 
survived had it lacked peasant support.
China, Cuba, Yugoslavia are also examples of 
mass involvement, however different the forms 
these revolutions took. They also refute the 
suggestion that “ illiterate peasants lack 
revolutionary potential. Leadership is, of course, 
necessary. But is it an acceptable revolutionary 
model for a leadership to proceed without mass 
support, whether in a Third World or capitalist 
country? And then to virtually make it obligatory 
to support the entry of massive outside force to 
make up for the internal lack?
All accounts of the situation in Afghanistan 
I have read, including those from supporters of 
what was done, admit the lack of peasant support,
I won’t canvas the evidence here, but suggest, for 
example, a reading of Fred Halliday's article in 
New Left Review, No. 119.
As to the general principles involved concerning 
acceptable outside aid, I suggested the following: 
political solidarity; material aid to remain under 
local control; aid not replacing local effort as the 
main force (Afghanistan, p. 76).
These may be inadequate criteria, but Jack does 
not suggest any others.
Imperialism active
Jack says: “ another view proceeds from the 
unspoken assumption that imperialism is not 
active in attempts to undermine and destroy 
revolutions in Third World countries” . I don’t 
know who on the left assumes this: I certainly 
don’t.
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The point is rather that imperialism is active 
everywhere, and if that alone were enough to 
justify intervention, armies would bemarching all 
over the place (as some of the trotskyist groups 
clearly want) and there would be no need for 
analysis of concrete cases.
One has to consider not only whether 
intervention is justified, but also whether that 
intervention will improve the internal situation. In 
Afghanistan, on both counts, the answer seems in 
the negative.
Jack thinks he finds a conflict between what I 
wrote and what Denis Freney wrote. My pointwas 
that the outside forces as seen on TV could hardly 
be taken as the main problem; Denis was pointing 
to evidence of the deteriorating internal situation. 
Our points are complementary rather than being 
in conflict.
Czechoslovakian parallel?
It is certainly not CPA policy to equate the two 
situations and few people in our party draw a 
parallel with Czechoslovakia in 1968, except 
perhaps in regard to involvement of Soviet forces 
in changing a leadership.
Jack may believe that the Soviet leadership no 
longer involves itself in this activity in general 
and did not do so in Afghanistan in particular. I 
hope it is true, but remain sceptical and think there 
was more than just a “ chaotic situation” when 
Amin was done in.
Nor do I think Jack’s assumption that Amin was 
the main source of factional conflict in the PDP is 
well established, except in the hindsight of the 
victors, who also now conveniently discover an 
association with the CIA.
Self-determination
Jack sees a danger of becoming rigid and one­
eyed in defending the right of self-determination. I
see a danger in this right being swept aside in the 
march of the big battalions and the demand to line 
up as required by self-appointed arbiters of 
strategy in “ the class struggle on an international
scale” .
This is not equivalent to viewing the principle of 
self-determination abstractly, and in the concrete 
case of Viet Nam I wrote:
(Our) support (for Viet Nam) is based on 
recognition that the Pol Pot regime, aided and 
abetted by China, invaded Viet Nam and 
refused all efforts at negotiation, and that 
Chinese hostility, soon to be manifested in 
military invasion, posed a threat to the 
continued ex is ten ce  o f a gen uin ely  
independent Viet Nam.
Destruction of the detested Pol Pot regime 
was a by-productand would not of itself justify 
Vietnamese intervention. And we believe that 
they should withdraw at the earliest possible 
moment, leaving the Kampucheans to 
exercise their right to self-determination. 
(Afghanistan: page 76)
Following a visit to Kampuchea and Viet Nam 
in June, the CPA delegation was able to further 
concretise the conditions under which we think 
that withdrawal should occur. (Tribune, July 2, 
1980)
In Uganda, also, overthrow of the regime of Idi 
Amin was effected by Tanzanian forces and 
dissident Ugandans following a destructive 
invasion of Tanzania.
Thus, while analysing particular cases and 
avoiding an abstract approach, the CPA considers 
that the principle of self-determination should be 
upheld for the reasons outlined in Afghanistan, 
page 75.
An example of the opposite line of thinking is 
found in the demand that the Eritreans and the 
Kurds should not, in the “broader interest” , 
struggle for independence or autonomy (Peter 
Symon in The Socialist, June 4, 1980).
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Maybe they should not — though that is open to 
question. But if they do so struggle, i8 their 
suppression by armed force to be justified in the 
name of socialism?
And can some country, or trend of opinion 
within the movement, set itself up as the final 
arbiters on such questions?
Automatic opposition to the Soviet Union?
Jack says: “The real danger (for the CPA, is not 
being asked to give unqualified support to any 
Soviet action but) is that of becoming locked into a 
position which compels automatic opposition to 
every ‘difficult’ action of the Soviet Union”.
To indicate the unreality of this assessment, I 
refer to my Comment on the Viet Nam-China 
conflict (ALR, No. 68):
We had to think about how to react if the 
Soviet Union had intervened. The lines along 
which our though ts were running were that we 
would have supported (Soviet) intervention 
against the Chinese invasion insofar as it 
helped Viet Nam and was a response to 
Vietnamese requests. But it would be 
conditional support —  conditioned by the 
degree to which we judged Soviet actions were 
also in pursuit o f other aims, unnecessarily 
escalated the conflict, etc.
In supporting Viet Nam and present Soviet 
assistance to it, are we 'switching back to the 
Russians’ in allegiance?
Not at all. We maintain our independent 
position.
Such an independent position does not 
preclude, but presupposes, support of, as well 
as opposition to, particular measures taken by 
various governments and parties, in 
accordance with our own assessment of those 
measures.
Equating blocs?
Nor is equation of the Soviet Union with the 
United States the CPA’s position. But we are not 
prepared to passively accept a situation in which 
we are willy nilly propelled into adhering to a bloc 
and following a bloc leader. I recently wrote:
It has been said that in a struggle between 
the Soviet Union and the United States, a 
‘class line' demands that one support the 
former without reservations against the latter.
If only the world were so simple!
And such an approach would reduce other 
countries and movements to a passive 
position, reinforcing the hegemony which bloc 
leaders are always trying to assert. In this
respect, though not in others, they may be 
equated.
The need today is rather for more forces, 
more countries and movements to have their 
own input into the world situation from the 
anti-imperialist side, for the perceptions of the 
Soviet leadership, made through the prism of 
national interests, are not always congruent 
with the needs of the movement in other 
countries, or as a whole. (Afghanistan, p.78.)
The present possibility of gravitating to 
uncritical submergence in one bloc arises 
particularly from the dangerous polarisation of 
the world today and the ‘freezing’ of policies and 
attitudes.
Relations between China and Viet Nam, for 
example, are pretty firmly set in a hostile course. 
And these relations do not exist in a vacuum, but 
are essentially related to the Sino-Soviet conflict, 
as is China’s lamentable gravitation to closer and 
closer collaboration with the United States.
We are likely to see more conflict in our region 
and in other parts of the world — conflicts 
expressing and pushing further forward the 
process of polarisation, and making more 
apparently compelling the demand that we give up 
our independent policy.
Despite such pressures, and although it is not 
immediately apparent what can be done to change 
things, I believe it would be a great mistake to 
regard the process of polarisation as total and 
already consummated, final and irrevocable.
The task before us requires much more flexibility 
than that. We should work to establish relations 
with all communist parties and radical 
movements with the aim of bringing our own mite 
to bear — on our own where necessary and in co­
operation with others where possible — to change 
alignments before they have completely hardened, 
leaving no one any latitude.
This is one of the aims of the non-aligned 
movement which Cuba, for example (president of 
the movement), perhaps now sees more urgently, 
post-Afghanistan, despite its differences with 
Yugoslavia.
When we do take up a firm position of support for 
one side (for example, Viet Nam in the present 
dispute with China), we should not do so on the 
assumption that the side we supportis, or has to be 
made out to be, composed only of angels.
If we think it right we should oppose (the Soviet 
Union in Afghanistan) or criticise (Vietnamese 
over-sweeping denunciation of everything 
Chinese, past and present).
We can do so without feeling that we are thereby 
weakening our anti-imperialist stand. I believe we 
are rather strengthening it.
- *************************************** 
A VOICE FROM HUNGARY
ANDRAS 
HEGEDUS
A debate among marxists of eastern Europe on an alternative democratic 
path o f development is under way.
The contribution o f Andras Hegedus to this debate is unique. He was the 
Prime Minister o f stalinist Hungary but has made a critical reappraisal of 
his own past and that of his country.
As a part of the “critical marxist opposition”, Hegedus was subjected to 
official silence for many years, but has recently emerged to give lectures at 
the university and to publish several works, mainly abroad, but also in 
Hungary itself.
In this interview he discusses the work of the best-known contributor to 
the eastern European marxist debate, Rudolf Bahro of the German 
Democratic Republic. (See “The Challenge of Rudolf Bahro” by Denis 
Freney, ALR No. 72, Dec. 1979.)
The interview was conducted in Budapest by Luigi Marcolungo and 
published in the Italian Communist Weekly Rinascita. Translated and 
abridged by Dave Davies.
You have been making a study of Bahro's views 
lately. What are your opinions?
Bahro’s contribution is important above all 
because of his denunciation, in its context, of blind 
apologetic faith and the philosophy of despair. In 
his examination of the societies of eastern Europe 
he bases himself on those socialist and humanist 
values which are an integral part of marxism and 
which I share in full.
However, I do not agree with his approach to 
marxism and with conclusions that he draws from 
his analysis of existing social relationships in the 
countries of eastern Europe.
What do you mean by this?
In my view, he bases himself on the premise that 
the classics of marxism have made an unequivocal 
forcast of future socialist societies, while in fact 
Marx and Engels made contradictory forecasts at 
different times, including on substantial aspects.
Hence the battle of quotations, of which the most 
grotesque is that between the supporters of the self­
management solution and the statist solution. 
What is necessary is a critical attitude to marxist 
orthodoxy, including marxist-leniniBt, that which 
performs an apologetic function such as in eastern 
Europe and also critiques in the capitalist 
countries.
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And although I wish at all costs to remain 
"critical” I must add (excuse what may seem a 
game with words) a “less critical” analysis of 
social relationsips in eastern Europe. I do not 
consider them to be a "deformation” bom of 
“despotism” but rather as a particular historical 
bloc (according to the gramscian concept) which 
has developed in particular historical conditions 
arising from previous social relationships specific 
to those countries.
This historical bloc, while offering limited 
possibilities of democratic development, has 
nevertheless in present conditions a capacity to 
reproduce itself.
What do you mean by "less critical" — for example 
in relation to the situation of the working class in 
these countries, judged by Bahro to be a 
subordinate one?
It is not possible to form an idea of the 
relationship between power and the working class 
in these countries without analysing the 
behaviour of the main types of workers who are 
socially active. To simplify to the extreme, I will 
say that there are two main types.
The first kind of worker is involved in the 
activity of the elective organs at all levels 
(parliament, municipal and regional councils, 
party committees, trade unions, etc) and lives out 
the official ideology and makes it his own in 
subjective terms. This worker, although 
participating in the real decision making 
processes in formal terms — something of which 
is completely conscious — does not consider 
himself separate from the real instances of power. 
And it should be kept in mind that even formal 
participation is, in sociological and even real 
terms, a type of participation whose influence is 
difficult to escape.
In Hungary the members of the voluntary 
workers’ militia are a part of this group. We should 
also take into account the movement from 
generation to generation that takes place in these 
societies, diminishing though it may be, which 
still broadens the composition of this group of 
workers. A good part of the officer corps of the 
various armed forces is still today formed from the 
sons of workers. This is especially true for the 
Soviet army and the workers of Russian 
nationality.
Unfortunately most of those who belong to the 
critical opposition dismiss with contempt this type 
of worker, who plays a role which cannot be 
overlooked even in numerical terms. If this is 
overlooked, the capacity of the system to reproduce 
itself in conditions of crisis — such as Hungary 
after N ovem ber 4, 1956 — becomes 
incomprehensible. Of course the motivations 
which come into play in the processes of 
integration of this group are another subject for 
analysis.
The lack of attention to the role and presence of this 
type of worker is also widespread among western 
observers of socialist countries. And the second 
type of worker?
Just as some do not take account of the first type 
of worker, the ideologues of official apologia do not 
know what to do with those who have an attitude 
of opposition. They are passed off as an 
insignificant minority or hooligans. At times of 
difficulty the label of counter-revolutionaries or 
agents of imperialism is stuck on.
But despite everything they exist and are 
probably not fewer than the first group, although I 
cannot support this with reliable sociological 
research. Their role becomes important at times of 
crisis but is present even in periods of “normality”.
It is these workers who keep awake the 
consciousness of class as a group separate from 
other social groups. This consciousness manifests 
itself among other things by the use of “we” 
(workers) and “they” (the leaders)...
Does this kind of differentiation also exist among 
intellectuals?
When I was teaching at the university I noticed 
that this differentiation begins among students. 
Some students are oriented towards an 
administrative or public career and finish up 
identifying with the institutions. They will be the 
“experts” , the replacements for those in power who 
lose their original character as intellectuals the 
more their career advances to assume the 
character of the various kinds of “bureaucrats”.
On the other hand there are intellectuals who 
reject identification with the institutions even at 
the price of giving up the advantages offered by 
the acceptance of leadership tasks. And this is 
precisely the group which forms the social base of 
the critical intelligentsia which sets itself the 
objective of autonomy. It is obvious that only a 
limited section of these reach an “active” critical 
attitude. Most of them limit their activity to one 
simple profession, avoiding carefully all 
involvement in the social or political field. The 
result is the accentuated “privatisation” of the 
whole existence of the individual so typical of 
eastern Europe.
Choosing this compromise is relatively easy in 
the field of natural science, but in the social 
sciences it is almost inevitable that a conflict 
occurs sooner or later between the two tendencies, 
the apologetic and the critical. This is 
notwithstanding the growth in the number of 
those seeking to remain neutral or “empirically 
objective” at all costs.
What is your analysis of the processes of 
bureaucrstisation of the societies of eastern 
Europe? And what do you think of the hypotheses 
advanced by Bahro?
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Bahro bases his position on a communism 
which we can define as “consequentially anti- 
bureaucratic”. He sees the dominant feature of the 
societies of  eastern Europe as the 
bureaucratisation of the relationships of power. 
He also maintains that the bureaucratic 
formations can be eliminated without particularly 
negative consequences, in a way which allows the 
building of an harmonious socialist or communist 
society.
And it is on this point that I do not agree. Firstly, 
because bureaucracy in the world of power 
structures assumes diverse and complex forms, 
even in opposition to each other: it is enough to 
consider the relationship between the directors of 
an enterprise and directors of the central economic 
organisms of the state, between the bureaucracy 
with ideological motivation and the technocracy 
(which represents the day to day conflict between 
economic rationale and political priority), between 
“political” leaders and “experts”. One cannot 
speak vaguely.
Further, I do not agree because while it could be 
conceded ... that bureaucracy can be limited by 
social control, it is pure utopia to think that it can 
be eliminated entirely.
Ba hr o  c o n c l u d e s  t h a t  b e c a u s e  of  
bureaucratisation, the revolutionary communist 
party has lost its function and is today nothing but a 
duplication of the state. Do you agree with this?
If Bahro is correct, then the only thing to be done
— as he himself proposes — is to transfer the 
functions of the party to the state in its capacity of 
an institutional system andorganise the 
communist party on a new revolutionary basis. 
But it would be necessary to explain why this 
process should be brought about, because the “lust 
for power” of the leaders is certainly not sufficient 
explanation.
In reality, the communist parties in power carry 
out an important function of social integration 
among state or public organs at various levels 
which pursue their own particular objectives.
And the importance of this function has 
increased with the years in these socieities, not 
diminished.
Bahro accepts the bureaucratisation of the 
institutional systems of those countries as a 
necessary evil as well as an historical necessity, 
but rejects as a useless evil the bureaucratisation 
of the communist party — which I maintain to be 
equally inevitable.
It seems that you have in mind a path of democratic 
development in eastern European countries 
different from that described by Bahro.
That is so. He thinks that in the countries of 
“actually existing socialism” a communist 
opposition will be formed sooner or later which will 
give rise to a truly revolutionary party. Having
taken political power, it will eliminate all useless 
bureaucracy, realising in practice the principle 
outlined in the classics of marxism.
But this prospect does not convince me. This is 
not so much for its lack of realism (in fact there is 
no trace of this process in the reality of these 
countries), but above all because the “new party”, 
having attained power and independently of its 
original anti-bureaucratic concepts, would not be 
able to escape the necessity of carrying out the 
same function of integration of the interests 
within the power structure like the present party.
The “ league of communists”  would be 
transformed therefore into an institution, the 
members of which, exercising power and bearing 
all the consequences of it, would find themselves 
trapped in an equally intricate system of 
relationships of mutual subordination.
Bahro warns of this danger, but maintains that 
it can be avoided with a cultural revolution. An 
important objection here is that in fact the 
societies of eastern Europe, within the limits 
imposed by economic development, are moving 
towards a consumerist model of life rather than 
towards a cultural revolution.
But the real objection is rather that there is a 
contradiction between the character of the 
individual hypothesised in Bahro’s cultural 
revolution and that of the member of the 
revolutionary communist party who is struggling 
for power.
In addition there is another important 
consideration. It is the danger that the 
replacement of the "bureaucratised party” by the 
new “revolutionary party” , this “exchange of roles 
between anvil and hammer” finishes up causing 
incalculable suffering to the population.
What prospects do you regard as possible for an 
alternative democratic development in eastern 
Europe? I know that you have been reticent about 
giving a precise answer, although you have 
maintained that it is not a matter of a return to a 
multi-party system.
I have reached the conclusion that the true 
alternative, both “possible and desirable” , can 
only be the attainment of a dichotomy within 
society which can guarantee the. pluralism 
indispensable for a democratic social life.
This dichotomy could be guaranteed on one 
hand by the existence of an institutional system of 
power. Although largely bureaucratised, it could 
carry out at the same time an historically 
necessary function above all in economics and 
more generally in assuring the more complex 
framework of social life.
On the other hand, there would be varous 
movements, more or less institutionalised, which 
could proVide social control* of the bureaucratic
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structure, but whose objectives should be limited to 
control* and not the acquisition of power.
These could be new movements or institutions or 
ones that already exist, for example, the trade 
unions, movements of youth, o f women, elected 
councils o f local autonomy, the press, etc. which 
have acquired or re-acquired their real autonomy. 
It is important to observe that, in Hungary for 
example, a developmentin this direction would not 
conflict with the Constitution or with the party 
program and could facilitate a true dialogue 
between those in power and the various social 
strata and the working class itself. Committment 
to this road could be the “ historical compromise” 
for eastern Europe, avoiding blood conflicts and 
making possible the beginning of democratic 
development, the unfolding of a form o f socialist 
democracy albeit particularised.
But I understand that this prospect would 
require from both sides an openess to agreement 
and compromise which is almost unimaginable 
today. On the part o f those in power it would mean 
the acceptan ce  o f  the birth o f  a certain  
institutionalisation o f autonomous movements 
which are independent of their direct influence. 
These movements should be able to form their own 
point o f view independently o f the exercise of 
power,
having also the possibility o f influencing public 
opinion with their own ideas.
But that pre-supposes the renouncing o f the 
traditional political objective of all political 
movements — that of attaining power — on the 
part of those social movements which acquire or 
re-acquire their independence from the party. 
Certainly, to arrive at such a compromise a great 
historical maturity and a deep understanding of 
the consequences o f an aggravation of the 
situation would be needed from all concerned.
The time at our disposal for this maturing seems, 
however, to be extremely limited and the 
possibilities of success therefore small. There 
remains the hope, a kind of faith, that progressive 
rationality can at last untie the intricate knot of 
particular interests and drives for power.
* Control is used here evidently in the sense o f  
"hold in cheek ’’, “ verify", or “ regulate” rather 
than its alternative meaning o f "dom inate” or 
“command”,
(Trans, note)
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Transnational Corporations and 
U.S. Imperialism
David Meredith
America: the new imperialism: from  
white settlement to world hegemony, by 
V.G. Kiernan, Zed Press, London. 1978. 
Corporate imperialism: conflict and 
e x p r o p r i a t i o n :  t r a n s n a t i o n a l  
corporations and economic nationalism  
in the Third World, by Norman Girvan, 
Monthly Review Press, New York. 1976. 
Reviewed by David Meredith.
In a world where the international situation 
appears to change rapidly, there is a great need for 
an historical approach to imperialism, to go back 
into its roots, trace its development and assist in 
an understanding o f why present-day changes
occur and what their significance might be. The 
title o f V G Kiernan’s book America, the new 
imperialism, from white settlem ent to world 
hegemony, is full o f promise, but the work itself 
contains many disappointments.
In keeping with his earlier works o f imperial 
history, Kiernan concentrates on capturing the 
mood o f America’s leaders and, to a lesser extent, 
the American people, at various points in their 
history, through literature, popular culture, and 
autobiography. America, the new imperialism  is 
thus more of a history o f opinion about US 
imperialism, than an analysis o f its causes and 
development. Despite the description o f Kiernan 
on the jacket cover as ‘an adherent o f the Marxist 
method of history’, the work is not one o f Marxist
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methodology or analysis. D H Lawrence, Walt 
Whitman, Joseph Conrad, Rudyard Kipling, 
Bernanrd Shaw, H G Wells and Edgar Rice 
Burroughs all receive more prominance than 
Lenin, Bukharin or Luxemborg. Kiernan’s 
comment that American capitalism has often 
seemed to be functioning on very much the lines 
traced by the theory o f imperialism pioneered by 
Hobson and developed later by Lenin’ (209), 
implies a fundamental misunderstanding o f 
Lenin’s theory. In fact, insofar as there is a 
theoretical framework, it is Hobsonian rather than 
Marxist. For example, Kiernan hardly mentions 
American monopoly capitalism; instead he tells us 
that “ Big Business” influences American foreign 
policy by the lobby system on Capitol Hill, and 
that ‘ ... most o f  the criticism levelled at the US is 
really criticism of capitalism in the form it has 
taken there; it has had long enough to colour the 
national disposition, but need not be thought 
identical with it’ (270). He goes on to elaborate the 
Hobsonian idea that capitalism does not rea lly  
need empire, and that foreign adventures are thus 
the works o f a few corporations interested in raw 
materials, o f naive politicians and evil-minded 
military leaders. The nation (separated in some 
undefined way from capitalism) has gained 
nothing from imperialism, except employment. 
The costs o f empire are paid by the whole nation — 
the benefits go to a powerful few.
Simarly, Kiernan often seeks to explain 
American imperialism in terms o f the personal 
failings o f its leaders. On the American support for 
Pakistan in the war with Bangladesh, he writes: ‘It 
seemed as if  the cult o f the bayonet, determined to 
uphold right-wing army regimes anywhere and 
everywhere through thick and thin, had taken a 
pathological hold on the decision-makers; a 
grotesque parody o f the law-abiding, demilitarised 
earth which was once the American dream.’ (237). 
The “ American Dream” has been betrayed, 
apparently, but there is no discussion of the 
origins and functions o f this “ dream” as a form o f 
social control and domestic cultural imperialism.
The work is not without some value. Its survey o f 
events since 1945 is useful and the book is highly 
readable. K iernan m akes som e pertinent 
comments on American imperialism in the Middle 
East: 'No nation in history has had a more 
expensive and disobliging ally (than Israel)...Most 
o f them economically underveloped, conservative, 
pious, the Arabs were tailor-made clients for 
America; by arming Israel against them 
Washington allowed Moscow to gain ground 
instead...America found itself landed with the 
contradictory task o f safeguarding both Israel’s 
holy places and its own, the oil wells’ (239-40).
Looking to the future, Kiernan sees some 
possible cracks in American hegemony, arising 
from the ever increasing financial burden of 
em pire (a truly H obson ian  con cep t), the
consequence o f propping up corrupt right-wing 
regimes that communism is thereby encouraged, 
and the creation o f  capitalism in Am erica’s neo­
c o lo n ie s  w h ich  co m p e te s  w ith  its  ow n  
manufacturing industry. Not very large fissures, 
to be sure, and not assisted by the weakness o f 
domestic opposition to US imperialism: as 
Kiernan rightly points out, Blacks, Puerto Ricans 
and Native Americans are highly critical, as 
recipients o f White imperialism at home, but 
organised labor and middle class students cannot 
be counted on for sustained opposition.
In sum, this is a readable introductory survey 
which gets better as it comes up to the post-1945 
period, but it does not contain the historical 
Marxist analysis one is led to expect, nor is it the 
definitive and comprehensive survey which is 
badly needed.
Whilst there is a shortage o f good general 
surveys o f capitalist imperialism, excellent case 
studies continue to be produced. One such 
co llection  is N orm an G ivan , C orporate  
Imperialism: Conflict and Expropriation, which 
gathers together for the first time six of his essays, 
published between 1970 and 1975. His theme is the 
imperialism o f transnational corporations in the 
Third World, and he illustrates it by studies o f the 
copper and aluminium industries o f Chile and the 
Caribbean.
An important contribution by Girvan is the 
model o f corporate imperialism which he presents 
in the first essay. There is sometimes a tnedency o f 
those on the left to criticise the actions of 
transnational mining corporations without 
attempting to place them in the context o f 
contemporary monopoly capitalism. Girvan 
defines corporate imperialism as a system of 
international capitalism in which power is 
exercised by owners and managers of capital in 
order to accumulate capital through appropriation 
o f surplus; the relationship between owners and 
managers o f  capital and other institutions and 
groups (eg. government bureaucracies, workers, 
peasants, unemployed) is one o f dominance and is 
institutionalised ib a framework o f large, 
integrated, transnational corporations. These 
TNCs as a group form the base o f the system. 
Individually, they are the system’s principal 
instrument o f action. Their individual aim o f 
growth and profit is the same as the appropriation 
o f surplus and accumulation o f capital which is the 
aim o f the system as a whole. Mineral-export 
economies will be in conflict with corporate 
imperialism over revenue matters — what share of 
the income from the industry goes to the TNCs — 
over structural matters — as the exporting 
country’s government attempts to use ineral 
wealth to diversify the economy, while the TNC 
strives to integrate it more fully into its world 
system and ultimately, over power issues, — the 
power to decide all the other questions in dispute.
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Conflict, Girvan is at pains to emphasise, changes 
the form of the relationship, but not necessarily its 
essence. Its essence lies in the power which the 
parent company exercises over its subsidiaries, the 
metropolitan centre over the the periphery:
The subsidiary's integration with the parent 
company comprehensive: its economic 
dependence is therefore total, and its subjugation 
to external authority aboslute. It is the 
imperialism of the parent over the subsidiary, as 
embodied in the power relationships and economic 
characteristic of the transnational firm, which, 
when reproduced on a world scale and transposed 
onto the centre-periphery pattern of the 
international capitalist economy, gives rise to the 
phenomenon that we have called corporate 
imperialism. (24-5).
Girvan shows how all the raw material 
industries in the Third World came to be foreiun­
owned as American and European monopoly 
capital expanded at the end of the last century. In 
copper, for example, ot was the same story in 
Montana and in Chile — the elimination of an 
embryonic capitalist class and the integration of 
resources into the operations of a monopoly 
company. Mineral-exporting economies in the 
Third World experience periods of rapid growth of 
exports, but eventually a state of relative 
stagnation is reached as the TNC moves on to 
more economic suppliers, or to new end-products. 
Girvan asks how can mineral industry initiate a 
process of self-sustaining growth in the wider 
economy that can outlast the boom period in 
mineral exports. Under corporate imperialism the 
answer is that it cannot:
...mineral industries in the peripheral countries 
have conspiciously failed to act as a catalyst for 
th e  g e n e r a t i o n  o f  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g  
growth.,.(Moreover)...this failure has occurred in 
spite of decades of active government intervention 
in these economies, using mineral-industry 
revenues to promote diversified development 
aimed at relieving economic dependence on 
mineral exports. Today, that goal is as far away as
ever for most if not all of the mineral export 
economies. (30-31)
This failure results from the subsidiary which 
owns the mining industry being integrated with 
the parent company, not with the local economy. 
Profits are remitted overseas, linkages are few, 
purchases are made from the parent firm rather 
than locally, capital is raised by the parent firm 
abroad and so forth. The host government and the 
subsidiary’s labor force attempt to bargain with 
the transnational for a larger share of the revenue 
flow. At some point in the history of the firm’s 
investment in the country, a larger share may be 
obtained. After the period of formal colonialism 
ended in the 1960s, generally the first generation 
of nationalist leaders were able to “renegotiate" a 
better deal with the TNCs. One problem here is 
knowing exactly what are the profits of the 
subsidiaries, but if this and similar problems can 
be overcome, the host government may find itself 
with increased revenues from the mining sector. 
The consequence of this is that taxes from mining 
become the main source of government revenue, 
the state apparatus expands rapidly, and the 
power of the bureaucratic-politician class is 
greatly strengthened. Income from mining now 
finances expensive development schemes which 
involve imports of capital and consumption goods. 
At this point, attempts to diversify run contrary to 
the interests of the TNC and the host government 
leaders and public servants, who then see any 
threat — including militant labor demands for 
higher wages and/or control — to the TNC as a 
threat to their own position. "Growth without 
development” sums it up:national income 
increases, as do levels of investment, imports, 
exports — but poverty and structural 
unemployment remain. Having obtained a “better 
deal" from the TNCs and become more dependent 
upon mineral exports, countries producing the 
same raw material sometimes come together to 
present a united front to the multinationals and to 
demand an even higher share. Some of these 
attempts have been very successful, e.g. OPEC 
and the International Bauxite Association. But
REVIEWS 43
the logic of the system remains: dependence on 
mineral exports is increased, the more 
“successfully" such organisations obtain price 
rises and other concessions. The final stage is full 
or partial nationalisation of the mining industry, 
which might or might not, depending on the 
conditions, leave the host government better off in 
terms of share of income flow and control over the 
industry, but it also does nothing to lessen 
dependence on a single mineral export.
Girvan argues persuasively that the only way 
out of this cycle of ever-increasing dependence is 
through disengagement from the international 
capitalist economy. Nationalisation is a necessary 
part of this, but must be seen as a first step towards 
economic independence rather than an end in 
itself. This strategy is not likely, of course, to 
appeal to the ruling class in Third World countries, 
[ct alone the TNCs, and thus he concludes a social 
and political revolution is necessary if the pattern 
of growth without development is to be broken.
The rest of the book consists of essays on 
particular mineral export economies and contain 
some important insights into the process of the 
integration of these economies into the TNCs 
empires, and the severe problem s o f 
disengagement. Girvan himself was partofateam 
advising the Guyanan government in 1970-71 
when it nationalised the Demerara Bauxite 
Company,a fully-owned subsidiary of Alcoa. Hia 
account of the difficulties in obtaining reliable 
figures from the company, the ability of Alcoa to 
influence the US State Department and the World 
Bank on their behalf, and the tendency for 
Guyana’s leaders to compromise and use the issue 
to advance their own careers, makes revealing 
reading.
The essay on Chile is also useful, particularly in 
placing the Allende government's efforts at 
nationalisation in the historical perspective of 
sixty years of US corporate imperialism. As in the 
case of Guyana’s bauxite, when a government 
takes on a US TNC, it must also reckon with the 
hostility and opposition of the US government, the 
World Bank and the CIA. The US government’s 
support was not for Anaconda and Kennecott as 
such, but for American transnational corporations 
in general: if Chile had been allowed to get away 
with it, the rest of the Third World might have 
followed in expropriating US assets and in 
electing radical governments. With the overthrow 
of Allende, the Pinochet government has returned 
the copper industry to its foreign owners and 
created a favorable framework for the TNCs. In 
many ways the situation resembles that of the 
industry in the 1920s, but as Girvan comments:
The Chilean copper wheel had come full circle. 
But not quite, for Chile will never be the same 
again. Few more comprehensive cases of 
imperialism associated with transnational
corporations have ever occurred. Few have ended 
so tragically. The lessons should not be forgotten. 
(94),
Finally, Girvan outlines a minerals policy for 
the Third World designed to end dependence. As a 
starting point, the country must aim to disengage 
from the international capitalist economy rather 
than to become more integrated with it. Full 
nationalisation of the mineral industry, together 
with localisation of staff and ownership, is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition. Mineral 
exports to the industrialised world must be phased 
out: mineral reserves are finite, they have already 
been depleted for little or no gain to the country, 
and in future they should be increasingly used for 
local purposes and the total output reduced. The 
industrialised world must accept that it has not the 
right to the raw materials of other countries, and 
will have to manage without them, or with a much 
reduced supply. The consequences are far- 
reaching, and Girvan acknowledges it is 
impossible to separate out a strategy for minerals 
from other aspects of the dependence of the Third 
World. However, he makes some important points
— that very successful producers'organisations in 
the long run are counter-productive, that 
indigenous technology and research should be 
devoted to developing local industries using the 
local raw materials and that this implies a change 
in consumption patterns, and that Third World 
countries should co-operate to engage in state-to- 
state transactions to by-pass the international 
capitalist economy.
Norman Girvan’s essays are lively, readable 
and thought-provoking. The issues he discusses 
are highly relevant to the future o f the 
unindustrialised world, and are not without 
significance to mineral-exporting industrialised 
economies, such as Australia.
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Anti-Personnel 
Weapons
It’s ironical that, in war, individual suffering 
haunts us more than thousands killed in a mass 
bombing raid. One is a personal tragedy; the other 
only a statistic.
The graphic television reporting of the VietNam 
war — which brought the war into our living rooms
— helped create an international campaign to 
revise the laws of war.
In the late 1960s, both the United Nations and 
the Geneva-based International Committee of the 
Red Cross (which is responsible for ensuring that 
the Geneva Conventions are kept up to date) began 
a massive effort to update the laws of wars. This 
work resulted in new laws, covering, for example, 
prisoners of war and victims in civil conflicts.
But little was done to abolish particularly nasty 
weapons like napalm, fragmentation weapons 
and high-velocity, low calibre bullets which create 
extensive wounds. These weapons are receiving 
additional attention. New international rules may 
yet be devised.
Malvern Lumsden, a m e m b e T  of the renowned 
Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, has written an excellent and detailed 
study of what these weapons are, and what they do 
to people.
His book covers the history of these weapons 
and the significant contribution to improving 
them made by the United States involvement in 
the Viet Nam war. He then Looks at the specific 
types of weapons, including new ones like the use 
of electric weapons, weapons which use sound to 
shock their victims, and lasers which burn out the 
victim’s eyes.
Attempts at banning weapons are almost as old 
as the weapons themselves. The Second Lateran 
Council, in 1139, for example, attempted to outlaw 
the crossbow's use between Christians. The ban 
didn’t last long.
About a century ago, when bur Victorian 
forebears believed themselves to be exponents of a
A nti-Personnel Weapons, by Malvern 
Lumsden, Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, 1978. Reviewed by Keith 
D. Suter.
new civilisation, new attempts were made to ban 
barbaric weapons.
The dum-dum bullet breaks up when entering 
the body and not only makes it difficult for 
surgeons to fish out all the fragments, but also 
takes the wound longer to heal. The dum-dum 
bullet itself was banned last century. The ban 
remains in force.
But the Americans — and Australians — have 
got around it by their high-velocity, low calibre 
bullet which ricochets within the victim's body. 
The bullet — as the Vietnamese found out — is 
similar to the dum-dum. But it is on this side of the 
legal boundary.
The laws of war in general have had more 
success than they are given credit for. The laws 
protecting prisoners of war are very useful. But 
attempts at banning particular weapons all have 
poor records.
The distinction between the combatant and his 
method of fighting is best seen by the oft-quoted 
irony of a World War II bomber pilot. Thecivilians 
killed by him weren’t protected by the laws of war. 
But if his aircraft were shot down, then he would 
have the privileged prisoner-of-war status which 
allowed him special treatment — the regulations 
even explained the type of work he could do in 
captivity and the way in which he was to be 
accommodated. At first glance it seems as though 
generals are willing to abide by rules which protect 
the enemy’s troops in captivity — provided their 
own captured troops were treated well by the 
enemy. But they wanted a free hand with which to 
kill the enemy and so refused limitations on 
weapons.
But the development of weapons has shown that 
generals don’t always like new weapons. If left to 
themselves, they wouldn’t have had submarines, 
bombers, tanks or mortars. These are not the 
gallant ways to fight wars. Instead, the new 
weapons have often been forced upon these men by 
politicians anxious for quick victory, Winston
REVIEWS 45
Churchill, for example, was intrumental in forcing 
his generals to use “Winston's folly” — the tank — 
in World War I. Behind the politicians have been 
the scientists and arms manufacturers. These 
have often forced the pace of new weapons. This 
doesn't deny that generals like new weapons. But 
when decrying new weapons, we shouldn’t always 
blame the generals automatically.
The scientists, then, play a very important role 
in changing the way in which wars are fought 
While the grand strategy is left to politicians and 
generals, the scientists are busy perfecting new 
techniques by which people are killed. The role of 
the scientists in nuclear warfare is well known. We 
shouldn’t overlook their equally significant 
involvement in developing non-nuclear weapons, 
like fragmentation weapons and napalm. Those 
weapons may not kill but they leave the victimsas 
near-dead cripples. There is no “peace” for them 
after the war ends.
What possibility is therefor theabolition of anti­
personnel weapons? T do not share Malvern 
Lumsden’s hope that international lawyers will 
find tidy norms and neat phrases to do the job, 
Their past record has been bad. There is little 
chance of their doing better in the future.
But the situation is not gloomy. On thecontrary, 
what international law isn’t doing — public 
opinion has already done. Napalm, for example, is
unlikely ever to be used again in a major war. 
Whatever military benefits there may have been 
for the Americans in Viet Nam in using napalm 
were far outweighed by the adverse public reaction 
at home and overseas. Every dollop of burning 
napalm which melted a Vietnamese helped forge 
the opposition to America’s campaign. It is 
unlikely that Australians, for example, would 
approve of laser weapons which burn out the eyes 
of an enemy or their children.
As long as wars are fought, weapons are needed. 
The overriding aim should be general and 
complete disarmament.
But we needn't wait until that golden era dawns. 
On thecontrary, disarmament negotiations can be 
helped by popular opposition to particular 
weapons. This opposition should be focused on 
preventing the use of weapons which cause 
unnecessary suffering. It should also be focused on 
encouraging scientists (many of whom around the 
world are working on the arms race) to follow 
alternative scientific activities.
It would be ironical — and yet possible — if 
popular horror at anti-personnel weapons 
triggered a renewed campaign to abolish weapons 
generally. Malvern Lumsden’s book contains 
considerable information upon which to build the 
campaigns. The arms race would be napalm’s last 
victim.
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The New Politics o f Human Rights
Keith ESuter
The N ew  P olitics o f  Human Rights,
James Avery Joyce, Macmillan, $20.00. 
Reviewed by Keith D Suter.
This is an excellent though very expensive 
introduction to the progress being made in the 
international protection of human rights. Dr Joyce 
has played a leading part, for almost 40 years in 
civil liberties and social reform movements on 
both sides of the Atlantic, aod so he is able to write 
with all the confidence of some one well versed in 
the practical side.
The first two chapters provide an historical 
background. However, the book’s main focus is on 
current developments.
The chapters include the importance of public 
opinion in protecting human rights, the threats to
human rights from science and technology, and 
new organisations and methods for protecting 
human rights. There are also case studies on, 
among others, Chile, South Africa and 
decolonisation.
There is a concluding chapter on new areas of 
human rights, such as the right to economic and 
social development and the right to peace. It is a 
pity that this chapter is so brief, since it is clearly 
breaking new ground and further information is 
required.
Among the book’s themes are, first, that more 
progress is being made in the international 
protection of human rights than is commonly 
realised.
Secndly, as some fields approach completion 
(such as decolonisation) so new fields of action
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open up (such as scientific and technological 
threats).
Third, the success of this work generally is tied 
closely to prevailing political thinking and the 
protection o f human rights cannot be 
compartmentalised but must be viewed in the 
wider political context, for example, western 
countries were slow to criticise South Africa’s 
racial politics partly becuase of their financial and 
military ties with South Africa.
The book should be widely read, not only by 
human rights activists but also by other people 
interested in the areas also covered, such as 
science and technology, development and 
disarmament.
New Guide 
to Marx's 
Capital
JanBruck
Guide to M arx’s Capital, by Michael 
Eldred and Mike Roth, London: CSF Books 
(Confreence o f Socialist Economists ), 1978, 
127pp, $4.25. Reviewed by Jan  Bruck.
At a time when activities in Marxist theory, both 
in the academic as well as the political sphere, 
have to carried out in cear degree zero temperature, 
a Guide to Marx's Capital such as this one might 
help isolated groups to revive their spirits and to 
survive the political winter. This small but dense 
book, co-produced by two members of a Sydney- 
Konstanz collective, provides, in five essays and 
two appendices, a clear skeltal outline of the three 
volumes of Capital, assisted by a handy 
"systematic glossary” , in which “ 145 key terms
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and concepts" are briefly explained in order of 
their appearance — a working strategy very useful 
for the study ofCaptVu/insmallgroups, under the 
guidance of experienced members but not for lone 
readers looking for an easy way into the secrets of 
Capital, or a teach-yourself-guide to Marx’s 
economic theory.
Apart from providing a basic outline, the book 
enters into fundamental questions of Capital 
analysis and challenges the interpretations of 
orthodox Marxism. The authors also make an 
attempt to improve Marx’s ‘logical-historical’ 
mode of presentation by developing it further in 
the direction of a systematic presentation, which 
gives ‘every day knowledge'its proper place in the 
unfolding of the systematic argument by 
developing along concepts step by step in a 
dialectic with general phenomena of capitalist 
daily life.
The dialectical presentation is not separated 
from an attempt to explain the contradictions 
contained in the value-form of labor and does not 
ignore the ‘dark’ section in the first chapter on 
"The Value Form or Exchange Value” , the 
significance of which is seen in terms of its 
developing a concept of money.
In the first appendix, the confusion caused by 
the treatment of the notion of labor powers as an 
industrial commodity is clarified, and the second 
shows how capital “ requires science and 
stimulates its development." The authors are 
aware that Capital is only a fragment of a system 
which is to prodive a more complex theory of 
modern society, and they see the kystematic 
reconstruction and further development of this 
fragment as the only way to overcome the 
economism in marxist theory. The guide helps to 
provide a first step in this direction.
■REVNEWi
World Futures—The Great Debate
Keith IX Suter
World Futures — The Great Debate,
Christopher Freeman and Marie Jahoda 
(eds.), Martin Robertson (Australasian 
Publishing Co.), $48.50. Reviewed by Keith 
D Suter.
This huge volume (over 400 pages) is an 
excellent introduction to the debate over 
futurology. Its opening chapters are a review ofthe 
main schools of though governing speculaton 
about the future.
The central chapters look at the debate in the 
contexts of food, energy, mineral resources, and 
technical change. The final chapters deal with 
various scenarios for the future and the dangers of 
the arms race.
This is not abookforgneral reading. II is written 
clearly and without the usual social science 
jargon. But it contains too much information to 
prevent easy absorptin. It is more a source book to 
be studied by people interested in the various 
subjects it covers.
Its main value is the survey of all the major 
forecasters in social science, starting in the 19th 
century but with particular emphasis on those in 
the 1960s and 1970s. It also covers Soviet writers 
(who are apparently the world’s most optimistic 
thinkers about the future). It also contains
information on what should be done, according to 
these people, to make the future a better world.
The book’s second strength is the attention to 
some critical issues. Each chapter is crammed 
with information. In dealing with food, for 
instance, attention is also given to the role of 
transnational corporations and predictions about 
climatic changes (the northern hemisphere has 
had for the past 25 years or so a cooling trend 
which has reduced the length of England's 
growing season by about 10 days).
Third, the book devotes some attention to 
energy. This has been a neglected issue in early 
forecasts, whose authors expected a good supply of 
cheap energy for the future. The book prefers 
energy conservation (especially  in the 
industrialised nations) with increased attention to 
coal mining and alternative energy such as solar 
power.
War is a subject often avoided in future studies. 
The book devotes a whole chapter to it. This, too, is 
full of interesting information. There is, for 
instance, a comparison of the lethalities of major 
weapons. We have come a long way: a sword rates 
20 while a one megaton nuclear fusion explosion 
rates 660,000,000 deaths. The authors lookatthree 
world views and note “that all three converge in 
seeing disarmament as a necessary condition and 
consequenee of ahigh growth, more equal world."
48 AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW No. 75
The book is overall optimistic about the future. 
The 15 authors regard it as desirable to strive fora 
world in which the current extreme inequalities 
between rich and poor countries are significently 
reduced not by a wo rid-wide return to “primitive” 
living, but by increasing the standard of living in 
the poor world much more rapidly than in the rich 
world. For example, the problem of food is not so 
much one of physical shortage but of income 
distribution.
The book’s main defect is its assumption of 
rationality among politicians and public servants. 
The book ends by returning to the “ inherent 
lunacy” of the arms race and a plea for arms 
reduction. A world consumed with a passion for 
weapons is not necessarily rational enough to see 
the advantages of sharing its resources and 
working for the betterment of humankind.
However, it is well worth reading. It is a pity 
about the price. Get the library to order a copy.
THE POLITICS OF HEALTH A N D  
WELFARE: 
A VIEW FROM THE LEFT
A series o f seminars sponsored by the Australian Left Review to examine 
the state o f health and welfare services in Australia today — why they don’t 
serve people’s needs and what can be done to change them,
October 15:
Cancer and the Environment: Warwick Pearse and I an Lennie.The 
growth of cancer shown to be an outcome of the destruction of the 
environment through the anarchy of capitalism.
October 22:
Your work may be dangerous to your health. Ian Lennie and 
Warwick Pearse: The occupational health system from the workers’ 
point o f view.
November 5:
And where do you live? Bob Boughton. The political economy of 
housing — who gains and who loses.
November 12:
The Food Industry and Health. Michael Bums. The link between 
corporate control o f the food industry and western society's major 
health problems,
November 26:
The Politics of Doing What Comes Naturally: Rebecca Albury. 
Under capitalism, not even the production of the next generation is 
left to chance — contraception, conception, childbirth, motherhood, 
fatherhood.
December 3:
And Last and Usually Least — the Kids, or Take Your Problem 
Somewhere Else, Madam. The nature and inadequacy of children’s 
services.
December 10:
Poverty and Social Insecurity: Sheila Shaver. Poverty is as 
common today as in 1880 with the mejority of poor being those 
whose labour power is not marketable. The Australian social 
security system supports the poor just as it perpetuates their 
poverty.
Place: Inner City Education Centre, 37 Cavendish St., Stanmore. 
Time: Seminar begins 7.30 pm sharp. Drinks and talk from 7.00 pm.
There will be no charge but donations to cover costs will be welcome. If child 
care is required, please ring and tell us. For more information, contact 
Patricia Healy, 827.3598.
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